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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Issues Raised in the Opening Brief 
Appellants (Claytons) raise twelve issues in the opening brief and ask the court to 
vacate a jury verdict in favor of Ford Motor Company. In the trial court, the Claytons 
alleged fourteen separate defects in the Ford Explorer involved in the accident. (R. 720-
25.) After a six-week trial, the jury rejected all defect theories in less than seven hours. 
The twelve issues in the opening brief range from a juror concealing his bias 
against the Claytons, to the trial court coercing the jury to reach a defense verdict, to Ford 
conspiring with a third-party engineering firm to perpetrate a fraud on the court. As 
demonstrated below, all twelve issues fail on their merits. In addition, six of these issues 
(1, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11) were not preserved. Four of these issues (4, 5, 6, 7) do not address the 
jury's only finding—that the Explorer was not defective—and therefore do not present 
grounds for reversal. One issue (12) does not raise an error, but instead urges the court to 
consider any errors cumulatively. The remaining issue (2) fails on its merits. 
Even though many of the issues fail for similar reasons, Ford will address them in 
the same order they are addressed in the opening brief. Before doing so, however, Ford 
will clarify the twelve issues and the standards that govern this court's review of them. 
Issue 1: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to consider an 
argument concerning evidence tampering where the alleged tampering was discovered 
during trial, but the tampering argument was first raised in an untimely post-trial motion. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to expand the scope of the issues 
presented in a motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Crookston v. 
Fire Ins. Exchu 817 P.2d 789, 812 (Utah 1991). To preserve an issue for appellate 
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review, a party must have objected in the trial court or demonstrate plain error. State v. 
King, 2006 UT 3,1(13, 131 P.3d 202. 
Issue 2: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding a report drafted 
by a non-testifying expert on the grounds that it lacked foundation and could not be used 
to impeach a witness who did not author it. 
Standard of Review: A trial court has broad discretion in excluding evidence for 
lack of foundation. Tias v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438, 440 (Utah 1979). 
Issue 3: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in using a special verdict 
form that simply asked whether the Explorer was defective instead of asking about each 
particular alleged defect in a separate interrogatory. 
Standard of Review: The use and content of special verdicts are a matter for the 
trial court's sound discretion. Cambelt Infl Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1241 (Utah 
1987). A party must timely object to errors in a special verdict form to preserve the issue 
for appeal. Moore v. Smith, 2007 UT App 101, ^[31, 158 P.3d 562. 
Issue 4: Whether the trial court erred in giving jury instructions 27, 30, and 31, 
which set forth duties concerning the manufacture and the use of a product. 
Standard of Review: Jury instructions are considered statements of law, which 
are reviewed for correctness. Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 429 (Utah 1998). Jury 
instructions, however, are reviewed in their entirety and are affirmed "when the 
instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case." 
Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 2001 UT 77, [^38, 31 P.3d 557. 
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Issue 5: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in bifurcating the trial into 
liability and damages phases. 
Standard of Review: The trial court's decision to bifurcate a trial falls within its 
inherent power to manage its docket, and accordingly, is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238, 1244 (Utah 1998). 
Issue 6: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding documents that 
concern vehicle models, prototypes, and designs not at issue in this lawsuit. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to exclude evidence is reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion. Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, ^|27, 123 P.3d 416. 
Issue 7: Whether the trial court erred in directing a verdict on a common law 
fraud claim where the Claytons failed to introduce any evidence that they reviewed, let 
alone relied upon, any allegedly fraudulent representations. 
Standard of Review: The court reviews for correctness the grant of a motion for 
directed verdict. Goebel v. Salt Lake City S. R.R. Co., 2004 UT 80,1J10, 104 P.3d 1185. 
Issue 8: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing jury 
deliberations to continue into the evening, when neither jurors nor the parties objected. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's management of its docket and trial schedule 
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 
Inc., 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 1992). To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party 
must have objected in the trial court or demonstrate plain error. King, 2006 UT 3 at ^ [13. 
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Issue 9: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing a juror to remain 
on the panel after the juror stated during trial that he had made up his mind, but did not 
indicate which party he favored, and no party objected to his remaining on the jury. 
Standard of Review: The decision to allow a juror to remain on a panel is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Hardin v. Bell 2002 UT 108, T|14, 57 P.3d 1093. 
Where a party fails to object in the trial court, the appellate court may only review for 
plain error and reverse upon a showing of actual prejudice. King, 2006 UT 3 at ^[13. 
Issue 10: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the 
severity of a rollover accident where there was no objection to its admission. 
Standard of Review: The court reviews decisions to admit evidence for abuse of 
discretion. Chen, 2005 UT 68 at f 27. To preserve an evidentiary issue for appeal, a 
party must object to its admission at trial. State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, ^9, 46 P.3d 230. 
Issue 11: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing a state trooper 
to testify, based upon experience and training, about what occurred during an accident. 
Standard of Review: A trial court is afforded considerable discretion in 
determining whether adequate foundation has been laid for the admission of evidence. 
Tjas, 591 P.2d at 440. A party must object to the admission of evidence at trial to 
preserve the issue for appeal. Cram, 2002 UT 37 at ^ [9. 
Issue 12: Whether issues 1 through 11 identify errors, and if so, whether those 
errors warrant vacating a jury verdict after a six-week trial. 
Standard of Review: Under the cumulative error doctrine, reversal is appropriate 
only where there is evidence of multiple errors that undermines confidence in the fairness 
of the trial. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993). 
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II. Issues Raised in Ford's Cross-Appeal 
The court need not reach the issues raised in the cross-appeal unless it vacates the 
jury's verdict on a ground relevant to Ms. Montoya's claims, which include the following 
issues in the opening brief: 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, and 11. Ford's cross-appeal provides an 
alternative ground to affirm as to plaintiff Kellie Montoya, who hired a lawyer, Keith 
Barton, well before the statute of limitations period expired, but failed to file a complaint 
against Ford for more than a year after the statute of limitations period expired. 
Issue 1: Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that 
Ms. Montoya first learned of her product liability claims against Ford on the date of her 
deposition, when her deposition occurred more than a year after she filed a complaint 
containing her product liability claims against Ford. 
Standard of Review: The jury's findings of fact are reviewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict and can be reversed only if reasonable persons could not possibly 
reach the verdict. Gillespie v. Southern Utah State, 669 P.2d 86L 864 (Utah 1983V This 
issue was preserved at R. 11483 at 78-79. 
Issue 2: Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the discovery rule applies 
where a plaintiff retains a lawyer well before the statute of limitations expires to represent 
her in regard to claims arising from an accident, but fails to file a complaint against the 
manufacturer of the product involved in the accident for more than a year after the statute 
of limitations expires. 
Standard of Review: The applicability of the discovery rule is reviewed for 
correctness. Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, [^32, 44 P.3d 742. This issue was preserved at 
R. 150-54, 2637-55, 3355-59. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L Nature of the Case 
This case arises out of a single-vehicle rollover accident. On November 27,1998, 
Tony Clayton, the late son of Fred and Dee Clayton, was driving a 1997 Ford Explorer1 
on Interstate 80 near the Utah-Wyoming border. Mr. Clayton was inattentive and his 
vehicle drifted off of the roadway onto the shoulder area where the road starts to curve. 
(R. 11479 at 51-52, 54, 59.) Mr. Clayton then initiated sharp steering inputs that caused 
the vehicle to exit the roadway and roll four times through the median. Mr. Clayton was 
killed during the rollover, and his fiance and passenger, Kellie Montoya, sustained 
injuries. Mr. Clayton was not wearing a seat belt. (R. 11479 at 47-48; 7801; 10247.) 
The Claytons brought suit against Ford alleging fourteen product defects.2 
(R. 720-25.) The Claytons maintain that it was not driver inattention, extreme steering 
inputs, and a failure to wear a seat belt that caused the injuries to Mr. Clayton and 
Ms. Montoya. Instead, it was a litany of defects in the Explorer, including various 
defects in its stability, in its handling, in its suspension, in its door structure, in its latch 
system, and in its seat belt system. (R. 720-25.) 
After a six-week trial, the jury rejected all defect claims. (R. 10608.) 
1
 In the record, the 1997 Ford Explorer is sometimes referred to as "UN 105 model." 
The separate alleged defects include: (i) components controlling up and down front 
wheel travel; (ii) anti-sway bar links; (iii) shock absorbers; (iv) steering tie rods; 
(v) center of gravity; (vi) interior softness; (vii) exterior hardness; (viii) door locking 
mechanism; (ix) roof impact causing door lock failure; (x) impact inertia activating 
interior door handle; (xi) door handle operating rods; (xii) seat belt restraint system; 
(xiii) lack of excursion-mitigating devices in seat belt system; (xiv) seat belt latch 
susceptible to internal unlatch. (R. 720-25.) 
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II. Course of Proceedings 
During the eight-year history of this case, the trial court devoted remarkable 
attention to the parties' various claims and afforded the Claytons extraordinary 
opportunities to develop their theories and present them to the jury. 
On November 22, 2000, Fred and Dee Clayton filed their complaint against Ford. 
(R. 1.) On May 14, 2002, Ms. Montoya filed a separate lawsuit against Ford, which was 
consolidated with this case the next year. (R. 314; 442.) The parties conducted extensive 
discovery, including several weeks of out-of-state depositions and one thousand eight 
hundred seventy four (1874) document requests to Ford. (R. 4585; 4596.) The parties 
also filed more than eighty (80) motions in limine, all of which were carefully considered 
by the trial court during a full-day hearing just prior to trial. (R. 9582.) 
At trial, the Claytons took fourteen trial days (3 weeks) to present their case, 
which included six full days of testimony by their principal expert witness, David 
Ingebretsen. (R. 11460-61; 11463-64; 11475-77.) During trial, the trial court conducted 
a full-day evidentiary hearing outside of the presence of the jury to determine the 
admissibility of several exhibits proffered by the Claytons. (R. 11476.) At the close of 
evidence, the jury returned a defense verdict in favor of Ford. (R. 10608.) On March 8, 
2007, the trial court entered final judgment. (R. 10879.) 
On March 21, 2007, the Claytons filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict and for a new trial. (R. 10949.) On April 16,2007, the Claytons filed an 
amended motion for new trial. (R. 11226.) On May 30, 2007, the trial court denied the 
timely post-trial motions and refused to consider the untimely amended motion. 
(R. 11370-77.) On June 26, 2007, the Claytons filed a notice of appeal. (R. 11387.) 
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III. Statement of Facts 
A. Facts Relevant to the Issues Raised by the Claytons 
Ford disputes the Claytons' version of the facts, a version rejected by the jury. As 
Ford demonstrated at trial, and as the jury found, the accident resulted from 
Mr. Clayton's inattentive driving, not a defect in the Explorer. (R. 10608.) Specifically, 
the injuries in this case resulted from (i) Mr. Clayton's failure to negotiate a gradual 
curve in the roadway, likely because he fell asleep; (ii) his excessive steering inputs in 
response to drifting off the roadway; and (iii) Mr. Clayton's failure to wear a seat belt. 
And while the Claytons contend that fourteen separate defects in the Explorer caused the 
injuries, Ford demonstrated at trial—and the jury agreed—that the Explorer was not 
defective. (R. 10608.) The evidence supporting the jury's verdict is set forth below. 
Ford's accident reconstructionist, Dr. Geoff Germane, testified that the vehicle 
was traveling between 72 and 80 mph when it left the roadway. (R. 11462 at 56-57, 
60-61.) Dr. Germane then testified that the vehicle left the road due to driver inattention, 
as there was no physical evidence of any kind suggesting that a sudden mechanical 
failure caused the accident. (R. 11462 at 61.) The tire marks on the roadway confirmed 
that the vehicle had (i) gradually drifted off the side of the road as if the driver had fallen 
asleep and (ii) turned suddenly as if the driver suddenly awoke and overcorrected in 
response to drifting off the roadway. (R. 11462 at 69-70.) Dr. Germane then testified 
that the tire marks were inconsistent with the Claytons' first defect theory—catastrophic 
suspension failure. (R. 11462 at 60-61, 70, 72, 74-76, 115.) Finally, Dr. Germane 
testified that the damage to the various parts of the vehicle, which the Claytons 
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characterize as evidence of defects, was caused by the violent rollover accident and was 
not the cause of the rollover accident. (R. 11462 at 116.) 
Ford also called Trooper Ross Pace, a 25-year veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol 
who investigated the accident. (R. 11479 at 5.) Trooper Pace confirmed that driver 
inattention—possibly falling asleep at the wheel—and excessive speed caused the 
accident. (R. 11479 at 51-52, 54, 59.) Trooper Pace also testified that there was no 
evidence of mechanical failure. (R. 11479 at 35-36.) The tire marks at the accident 
scene were instead consistent with a driver (i) gradually leaving the roadway due to 
inattention and (ii) radically overcorrecting once he realized his error. (R. 11479 at 52-
54.) 
Trooper Pace further testified that the seat belt system was working properly and 
was not in use at the time of the crash. (R. 11479 at 47-48.) Trooper Pace's seat belt 
inspection findings were corroborated by Ford's seat belt expert, Michael James, who 
confirmed that the driver's restraint system exhibited no signs of use. (R. 7801, 10247.) 
In addition to their handling and seat belt claims, the Claytons also alleged that the 
Explorer's door latch system was defective because the driver's side door unlatched and 
opened during the violent rollover accident. (R. 11474 at 4, 40.) In response to this 
claim, Ford presented a mechanical engineer with expertise in door latch systems, Dr. Ed 
Caulfield, who testified that the driver's door had opened because the latch was 
overwhelmed by the heavy, unbelted driver being forced against the door during the 
violent rollover, not due to a defect in the latch. (R. 11480 at 13, 29-30, 44-46, 49-53.) 
Finally, Ford presented testimony and vehicle testing data from two former Ford 
engineers, Don Tandy and Robert Pascarella, who testified that the Explorer was not 
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defective with regard to its stability and handling. (AOB Addendum 18.) Mr. Tandy's 
testimony was that the Explorer had adequate handling characteristics and appropriate 
wheel base dimensions. (R. 11482 at 28.) Mr. Tandy further testified that the vehicle 
was thoroughly tested in a fully loaded condition prior to production, and the Explorer 
handled appropriately and had a reasonable resistance to rollover, regardless of which 
type of tire was on the vehicle. (Id. at 45, 47.) 
After considering and weighing all of the evidence presented during the six-week 
trial, the jury found in favor of Ford on all defect theories. (R. 10608.) 
B, Facts Relevant to Ford's Cross-Appeal on the Statute of Limitations 
On May 14,2002—more than three years after the accident—Appellant Kellie 
Montoya filed her complaint against Ford.3 (R. 314; 442.) Ford moved for summary 
judgment on Ms. Montoya's claims on the ground that they were barred by Utah's 2-year 
product liability statute of limitations. (R. 2637-55.) The trial court denied the motion, 
finding that there were disputed issues of fact as to when Ms. Montoya learned of, or 
reasonably should have discovered, her cause of action. (R. 3355-59.) A copy of the trial 
court's ruling is located at Addendum A. 
Ms. Montoya.recalls that in 1999 Fred Clayton helped her write a letter to his 
insurance company to obtain insurance benefits for the accident. (R. 2639; 2688; 11478 
at 41.) In a letter dated March 9, 1999, Ms. Montoya stated that she was writing to 
3
 On January 23, 2002, Kellie Montoya filed a motion for leave to file an amended 
complaint in this lawsuit, even though she was not a party to this lawsuit. (R. 108.) 
On the same day, without leave, she also filed an amended complaint. (R. 120.) On 
April 29, 2002, the trial court denied Ms. Montoya's motion for leave to file an amended 
complaint. (R. 209.) This ruling has not been appealed. Therefore, the date of filing for 
statute of limitations purposes is May 14, 2002, not January 23, 2002, although the earlier 
January date also falls well outside the 2-year statute of limitations. 
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"resolve my claim against Fred Clayton, whose car I was riding in with my fiance, Tony 
Clayton, when the tragic accident occurred." (R. 2639-40; 2688, 11478 at 44.) The letter 
then lists the injuries Ms. Montoya sustained in the accident, including a scar on the right 
side of her face, a scar on her chin, and a missing tooth. (R. 2639; 2688; 11478 at 45.) 
A month later, Ms. Montoya retained Keith Barton, a local personal injury 
attorney, to represent her with respect to her injuries. (R. 2640; 2734; 11478 at 47.) On 
April 13, 1999, Mr. Barton came to Ms. Montoya's home where Ms. Montoya signed an 
engagement letter that identifies her as "client." (R. 2642; 2734; 11478 at 66-67.) The 
engagement letter defines the scope of Mr. Barton's engagement as follows: "to 
represent you in the matter of your claims against all parties arising out of injuries which 
occurred on or about the 27th day of November, 1998." (R. 2642; 2734; 11478 at 69 
(emphasis added).) A few months later, Mr. Barton secured a settlement for 
Ms. Montoya against Fred Clayton's insurance company for $85,000, which was 
memorialized in a formal settlement agreement and release dated June 29, 1999. 
(R. 2642; 2739; 11478 at 73.) 
After trial, the jury found that the earliest Ms. Montoya knew, or in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered, that Ford may be responsible for her 
injuries was October 28, 2003, the date Ms. Montoya was deposed in this case. 
(R. 10608-10.) Ms. Montoya's deposition took place more than seventeen (17) months 
after she filed her complaint against Ford. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Claytons raise twelve issues in the opening brief. Six issues were not 
preserved. Four issues do not address the jury's sole finding of no defect, and therefore, 
any errors they identify were harmless. One issue does not allege an error, but urges the 
court to consider errors cumulatively. The sole remaining issue fails on its merits. 
In the argument section of this brief, Ford will address each issue in the order 
presented in the opening brief. Ford will also address the merits of each claim, even 
though many of them fail because they were waived or allege harmless errors. In this 
summary, however, Ford will address the claims according to common defects to provide 
the court a better roadmap to evaluate the litany of claims the Claytons raise. 
I. Preservation 
The first group includes issues numbered 1, 3, 8, 9, 10, and 11. These issues were 
not preserved. The Claytons' first issue states that the trial court abused its discretion in 
failing to grant a new trial for an "irregularity in the proceedings" under Rule 59(a)(1). 
The "irregularity" was the jury considering photographs that allegedly depict a door latch 
that was tampered with. In the opening brief, the Claytons claim that they first learned of 
the alleged tampering during trial. Yet the Claytons did not allege tamping until after an 
adverse jury verdict, and then raised their Rule 59(a)(1) argument only in an untimely 
post-trial motion. The trial court refused to consider the merits of the untimely tampering 
argument. Therefore, the issue was not preserved for appeal. 
The Claytons' third issue states that the trial court abused its discretion in asking a 
single interrogatory concerning defect on the special verdict form instead of asking an 
interrogatory for each alleged defect. While the Claytons objected to the special verdict 
8726076 12 
form on numerous grounds, the failure to list each defect was not one of them. 
Therefore, the issue was not preserved for appeal. 
The Claytons' eighth issue states that the trial court abused its discretion by 
"coercing" a defense verdict when it allowed jury deliberations to continue into the 
evening. Yet neither the Claytons nor any juror ever objected to deliberations continuing 
into the evening. Therefore, the issue was not preserved for appeal. 
The Claytons' ninth issue states that the trial court abused its discretion by 
allowing a juror to remain on the panel after the juror stated that he had made up his mind 
but did not indicate which party he favored. The Claytons not only failed to object to the 
trial court's solution—an instruction to the jury—but agreed with this course of action. 
Any error therefore would have been invited. The issue was not preserved for appeal. 
The Claytons' tenth issue states that the trial court abused its discretion by 
admitting evidence of the severity of the accident. The Claytons did not object to the 
introduction of this evidence at trial and do not argue plain error on appeal. Therefore, 
the issue was not preserved for appeal. 
The Clayton's eleventh issue states that the trial court abused its discretion by 
allowing the state trooper who investigated the accident to testify about how the accident 
occurred and whether the driver was wearing a seat belt. The Claytons not only failed to 
object during the trooper's testimony, but the objectionable content of his testimony was 
(i) introduced by the Claytons through Fred Clayton when he testified about what the 
trooper had told him and (ii) contained in an accident report introduced into evidence by 
the Claytons. Therefore, this issue was not preserved for appeal. 
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II. Harmless Error 
The second group of issues includes those that do not address the sole basis for the 
jury's verdict in favor of Ford—no defect in the Explorer. Therefore, assuming these 
issues demonstrate errors, any errors were harmless. These are issues 4, 5, 6, and 7. 
The Claytons' fourth issue states that the trial court erred in giving jury 
instructions 30 and 31,4 which set forth Mr. Clayton's duties as driver of the Explorer. 
These instructions pertain only to comparative fault, and the jury never reached any 
comparative fault issues. Therefore, any error was harmless. 
The Claytons' fifth issue states that the trial court abused its discretion by 
bifurcating the trial into liability and damages phases. The Claytons presented all of their 
evidence concerning defects in the liability phase. Therefore, any error was harmless. 
The Claytons' sixth issue states that the trial court abused its discretion by 
excluding documents concerning vehicles and prototypes other than the Clayton 
Explorer. The Claytons argue that such evidence demonstrated Ford knew of defects in 
prior vehicles and did nothing to correct the defects when designing the Explorer. Yet 
such evidence could not have provided Ford notice of defects in the Explorer because, as 
the jury found, there were no defects in the Explorer. Therefore, any error was harmless. 
The Claytons' seventh issue states that the trial court erred in directing a verdict on 
the Claytons' common law fraud claims. The Claytons argue that Ford's advertising was 
deceptive because it described the Explorer as safe. However, because the jury found no 
defect, the advertising was not misleading. Therefore, any error was harmless. 
The Claytons also argue that the trial court should not have given jury instruction 27 
because it reflects a recent Utah Supreme Court opinion instead of an outdated MUJI. 
This claim misunderstands that MUJI is not law, but appellate court opinions are. 
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III. Remaining Issue 
This leaves one issue that both is preserved and addresses the jury's finding of no 
defect. The Claytons' second issue states that the trial court abused its discretion by 
excluding an expert report prepared by a non-testifying expert. The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion because a testifying expert cannot provide foundation for the 
admission of an expert report he did not draft. The Claytons' second argument also fails. 
In the end, the Claytons provide no grounds to vacate the jury's verdict. 
IV. Cross-Appeal 
Ford also advances a conditional cross-appeal on the issue of whether Kellie 
Montoya's claims are precluded by the statute of limitations. It is undisputed that 
Ms. Montoya filed her claims outside the limitations period. The sole question is whether 
the discovery rule can save her claim. Addressing this issue, the jury found that 
Ms. Montoya first learned of her claims against Ford when she was deposed in this 
lawsuit, a year after she filed her claims against Ford. This finding is illogical, clearly 
erroneous, and has no evidence to support it. The court should vacate the finding. 
Ford also was entitled to summary judgment on its statute of limitations defense. 
More than a year before the statute of limitations expired, Ms. Montoya retained a lawyer 
to represent her with regard to aH claims stemming from the accident, and yet she failed 
to file any claims against Ford for more than a year after its expiration. Ms. Montoya 
knew Ford manufactured the vehicle involved in the accident when she hired a lawyer. 
The discovery rule therefore cannot save her claims. If the court vacates the jury's 
verdict, it should affirm as to Ms. Montoya on the alternative ground that her claims are 
barred by the statute of limitations. 
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ARGUMENT 
The opening brief provides no reason to vacate the jury's finding that the Explorer 
is not defective. As the Utah Supreme Court has explained, the right to jury trial "should 
be jealously guarded by the courts," such that "once having been granted such right and a 
verdict rendered, it should not be regarded lightly nor overturned without good and 
sufficient reason; nor should a judgment be disturbed merely because of error." Bowden 
v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co.. 286 P.2d 240, 250 (Utah 1955). The Claytons 
have not satisfied this burden. 
The trial court afforded the Claytons seven years to develop their fourteen defect 
theories against Ford and then nearly three weeks to present them to a jury. The trial 
court carefully considered more than one hundred (100) motions, including a full-day 
hearing on motions in limine just before trial and a full day hearing on the admissibility 
of exhibits during trial. After six weeks of trial, the jury considered all of the evidence 
and rejected each defect claim. The jury instead accepted the evidence indicating that the 
rollover accident was caused by (i) the vehicle drifting onto the shoulder when the driver 
fell asleep, (ii) the driver overcorrecting once he realized he had drifted off the road, and 
(iii) the driver failing to wear a seat belt. 
In the opening brief, the Claytons raise twelve issues and seek to vacate the jury 
verdict. As demonstrated below, six of the issues were not preserved. Another four 
issues are unrelated to the jury's finding of no defect and, therefore, provide no basis for 
vacating the jury's verdict. Of the two remaining issues, one fails on its merits and the 
other does not allege an error at all. In the end, the opening brief fails of identify any 
errors, let alone errors that warrant vacating a jury verdict. The court should affirm. 
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I. The Claytons' Tampering Argument Was Not Preserved and Is Undermined 
by the Testimony of the Claytons' Own Expert Witness 
The Claytons' first argument is that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to 
grant them a new trial under Rule 59(a)(1) for an "irregularity in the proceedings.55 (AOB 
at 15.) The irregularity the Claytons allege is that Ford and its attorneys conspired with 
witnesses and a third-party engineering firm to tamper with evidence and perpetrate a 
fraud on the court by placing a door latch in a partially open position just before trial. 
(AOB at 15-22.) The Claytons5 only evidence of this alleged tampering is a few 
photographs that the Claytons interpret as depicting the door latch in different positions at 
different times during the course of the proceedings. 
Aside from being outrageous and without record support, the Claytons5 tampering 
argument fails on a number of procedural and substantive grounds. First, the tampering 
argument was waived. The Claytons did not raise it during trial or in a timely motion for 
new trial, even though the Claytons now claim to have discovered the alleged tampering 
during trial. Second, the tampering argument fails on its merits. The Claytons5 own 
expert witness testified that (i) the latch was initially in the partially open position and 
(ii) the latch was in the same position during trial as it was in when he first examined it. 
Third, any error was harmless. The opening brief never explains how an alleged 
"irregularity55 in the proceedings—not raised by the Claytons, their attorneys, or their 
expert witnesses until after an adverse verdict—could have so polluted jury deliberations 
to warrant a new trial. In fact, there was ample evidence to support the jury's finding of 
no defect. Any one of these grounds is sufficient to affirm. 
Before discussing the various grounds to affirm, however, Ford provides some 
context for the Claytons5 tampering argument. The dispute concerning the door latch 
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centers largely on'how the driver's side door of the Explorer opened during the accident. 
The Claytons' expert witness—Mr. Gilberg—testified that the door latch failed because it 
was defective is various ways. Ultimately, Mr. Gilberg did not deny that the latch was 
found in a partially open position; he instead claimed that the latch was partially open 
only because of damage it sustained after the door came open.5 (R. 11474 at 217-18.) 
In contrast, Ford's expert witness—Dr. Caulfield—testified that the door latch was 
not defective, and instead was overwhelmed by the extreme forces of the crash, including 
substantial rotational forces, the heavy unbelted driver pressing against the door, and 
multiple impacts during the four rollovers. (R. 11480 at 13, 29-30, 44-46, 49-53.) 
Dr. Caulfield also testified that the latch was in a partially open position, but that it was 
forced into that position at the same time the door opened during the accident. (Id.) 
Therefore, in the end both Mr. Gilberg and Dr. Caulfield agreed that the latch was 
found in the partially open position. The focus of their dispute centered on whether the 
latch was forced into the partially position at the same time, or after, the door opened 
during the accident. On this point, the jury agreed with Ford after considering a number 
of photographs and the testimony of both parties' experts, all of which was admitted 
without any suggestion of tampering. This alone demonstrates that the Claytons' belated 
tampering allegation—based entirely upon a few photographs depicting the latch in the 
partially open position—is nothing more than a distraction, and an outrageous one at that. 
As demonstrated below, the Claytons' tampering argument is not properly before 
the court, but if it were, no evidence supports it, let alone warrants vacating a jury verdict. 
5
 Specifically, Mr. Gilberg explained that the latch was not in "a completely open 
position" only because it had "interacted] with the ground and [was] slammed into the 
ground several times." (R. 11474 at 219.) 
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A. The Claytons Waived Their Tampering Argument By Failing to Raise 
It at Trial, Failing to Raise It in a Timely Motion for New Trial, and 
Failing to Appeal the Trial Court's Refusal to Consider Their Untimely 
Argument 
With the tampering argument, the Claytons seek a new trial under Rule 59(a)(1) 
for an "irregularity at trial."6 (AOB at 15.) This issue is not properly before the court for 
a number of reasons. 
First, in the opening brief the Claytons allege that the tampering occurred weeks 
before trial and that they discovered the alleged tampering during trial. (AOB at 13.) 
Nonetheless, prior to an adverse verdict the Claytons never moved for a mistrial, asked 
for a curative instruction, or raised an objection of any kind. (R. 11480 at 120; 11481 at 
97-128.) And the Claytons do not argue plain error on appeal. Thus, the issue is not 
preserved for appellate review. State v. King, 2006 UT 3, ^13, 131 P.3d 202 (to preserve 
an issue for appellate review, a party must object in the trial court or demonstrate plain 
error); State v. Baker, 935 P.2d 503, 510 (Utah 1997) (when provided an opportunity, a 
party must attempt to cure an error during trial to preserve the issue for appeal). 
Second, the first time the Claytons alleged tampering was in their Rule 50 motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, not in a motion for new trial under 
Rule 59(a)(1). (R. 10953-59.) The trial court denied the motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict because the Claytons had "failed to timely move for directed 
verdict on the door latch claim." (R. 11375.) This ruling was correct. Pollesche v. 
Transamerican Ins. Co., 497 P.2d 236 n.l (Utah 1972) (a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict cannot be granted unless the moving party had timely moved 
6
 Rule 59(a)(1) permits a new trial based upon "[i]rregularity in the proceedings of the 
court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which 
either party was prevented from having a fair trial." 
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for directed verdict). More important, the Claytons have not appealed this ruling, which 
is located at Addendum D. The opening brief does not argue that the alleged tampering 
somehow entitles the Claytons to judgment as a matter of law. The tampering argument 
raised in a timely post-trial motion is not before the court. 
Third, the Claytons first raised the tampering argument that appears in the opening 
brief—irregularities at trial under Rule 59(a)(1)—when they attempted to amend their 
motion for new trial to add this argument. (R. 11226.) A copy of the amended motion is 
located at Addendum E. The Claytons' original, and timely, motion for new trial raised 
three errors of law under Rule 59(a)(7): (i) excluding a report generated by Ford's non-
testifying expert, (ii) allowing testimony of the highway patrolman who investigated the 
accident, and (iii) coercing the jury into reaching a defense verdict by sequestering them. 
(R. 10953.) The Claytons' timely motion for new trial does not mention tampering. 
Only after Ford filed its response to the post-trial motions did the Claytons move to 
amend their motion for new trial to add the Rule 59(a)(1) irregularity claim.8 (R. 11226.) 
The Claytons then, without leave, set forth their Rule 59(a)(1) tampering argument for 
the first time in their reply memorandum in support of their timely motion for new trial 
under Rule 59(a)(7). (R. 11236-42.) 
The trial court never granted the Claytons leave to amend their motion for new 
trial, and once the trial court denied the Claytons' timely post-trial motions, their request 
7
 Rule 59(a)(7) permits a new trial for an "[ejrror in law." 
Q 
If the Claytons were not requesting leave to file an amended new trial motion, and 
instead were merely filing a new motion outside the 10-day limit, then the trial court had 
no jurisdiction to consider it because it was untimely. Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 
1321 (Utah 1982) (when "an untimely motion is made, the trial court's only alternative is 
to deny the motion"). 
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for leave to amend their motion was denied by operation of law. State v. Mullins. 2005 
UT 43, T[8, 116 P.3d 374 ("When a final disposition of a case is entered by a district 
court, any unresolved motion inconsistent with that disposition are deemed resolved by 
implication."). Importantly, the Claytons have not appealed the denial of their request to 
amend their motion for new trial. Thus, this issue also is not before the court.9 
Fourth, even if the trial court had granted the Claytons leave to raise their belated 
Rule 59(a)(1) argument, the trial court's refusal to consider the merits of the Claytons' 
argument precludes appellate review. Under Utah law, "[i]f the trial court refuses to 
address the merits of a newly advanced argument [in post-trial motions], the issue 
remains unpreserved for appellate review." State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, *j}46, 114 P.3d 
551. Here, the trial court never addressed the merits of the Claytons' Rule 59(a)(1) 
argument concerning tampering. Therefore, the issue was not preserved. 
The Claytons waived the tampering argument by failing (i) to raise it at trial; (ii) to 
appeal the denial of the only timely post-trial motion that contained a tampering 
allegation; and (iii) to appeal the denial of their request to file an amended motion for 
new trial to include their Rule 59(a)(1) argument. Moreover, because the trial court never 
addressed the merits of the tampering argument, the issue is unpreserved. The court 
should not address the tampering argument for the first time on appeal. 
Even if the Claytons had appealed this ruling, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in refusing to consider the new argument. Dotson v. Clark Equip. Co., 805 F.2d 1225, 
1228 (5th Cir. 1981) (not an abuse of discretion for trial court to refuse to entertain an 
"amended" new trial motion); Pate v. Seaboard RR., Inc., 819 F.2d 1074, 1086 (11th Cir. 
1987) (reviewing for abuse of discretion whether to allow "appellants to assert a new 
ground for relief in its amended motion for a new trial"). Ford had no opportunity to 
respond to the new argument raised for the first time in a reply memorandum. 
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B. Both the Claytons' and Ford's Door Latch Experts Testified that the 
Door Latch Was in a Partially Open Position 
In addition to being waived, the Claytons' tampering argument also fails on its 
merits. The Claytons' tampering allegation is based entirely upon the comparison of a 
few photographs. The Claytons assert that earlier photographs depict the door latch in a 
"completely open" position, whereas later photographs (after the alleged tampering) 
depict the door latch in a "partially open" position. (AOB 13-18.) The Claytons then 
argue that because the jury saw the later photographs and heard witnesses testify about 
the later photographs—without objection—the trial court abused its discretion in failing 
to grant a new trial. The Claytons' argument is undermined by their own expert witness's 
testimony that the latch was in the same condition at trial that it was in when he first 
examined it—before the alleged tampering occurred. (R. 11474 at 217.) 
The tampering argument does not warrant a new trial. This court does not reverse 
the denial of a motion for new trial "absent a clear abuse of discretion."10 Goddard v. 
Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1984). In addition, this court "will presume that the 
discretion of the trial court was properly exercised unless the record clearly shows to the 
contrary." Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984). Here, the record is 
replete with evidence that the latch was in the partially open position, and therefore, the 
later pictures are accurate, not evidence of conspiracy and fraud on the court. 
The testimony of the Claytons' own expert, Mr. Gilberg, undermines the Claytons' 
assertion that the earlier photographs depict the latch in a "completely open" position. 
10
 The Claytons refer to Chewning v. Ford, 579 S.E.2d 605 (S.C. 2003), in support of 
their tampering argument. The Claytons misstate Chewning, where a plaintiff filed a 
complaint alleging Ford had committed fraud during a trial. The trial court dismissed the 
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). The court held that the allegations could survive the 
12(b)(6) standard. This is a far cry from demonstrating fraud. 
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Mr. Gilberg testified that the latch frame and internal components were severely damaged 
during the rollover and that the fork bolts would not completely open. When asked 
whether the latch was in the open position, Mr. Gilberg responded that it was "[n]ot 
completely" open, and then explained why it was not fully open: "It's just not fully open. 
And it's pinned somewhat in that condition because of the way the frame is damaged." 
(R. 11474 at 217-18.) Mr. Gilberg then testified that, in his opinion, the latch would have 
been found in an open position "[i]f the door didn't interact with the ground and get 
slammed into the ground several times." (Id. at 218.) In other words, the latch was not in 
a completely open position because the door "slammed into the ground several times." 
None of the photographs are inconsistent with Mr. Gilberg's testimony. The 
photographs—found at the Claytons' addenda 55-60, 62, and 64—are taken at different 
angles and, as the Claytons' admit in their opening brief, the latch was "partially 
movable," so it is unsurprising that the photographs are not identical in every respect. 
(AOB at 13.) What the photographs have in common, however, is that they all depict the 
latch in the partially open position, just as the Claytons' own expert testified. 
During the Claytons' aggressive cross-examination of Ford's expert witness, 
Dr. Caulfield, he consistently testified that all of the photographs depict a partially open 
latch. Ford will provide just three examples. First, when viewing photograph numbered 
304-F, Dr. Caulfield testified that "[i]t's partially open, but not all the way open." (R. 
11481 at 108.) Second, when viewing photographs numbered 320-D, Dr. Caulfield 
testified that the door latch is "not fully open." (Id. at 112.) Finally, when viewing 
photographs numbered 320-H, Dr. Caulfield again testified, "it's not fully open here 
because you can see the nose of the latch sticking out." (Id. at 114.) 
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The photographs simply do not depict the latch in a "completely open" position. 
If the court reaches the merits of the Claytons' belated tampering argument, it should 
reject it out of hand. 
C. The Alleged Tampering Could Not Have Affected the Jury Where the 
Claytons, their Attorneys, and their Experts Saw No Reason to Allege 
Tampering Until After an Adverse Verdict 
The tampering argument not only was waived and fails on its merits, the Claytons 
also have not explained how the jury viewing a few photographs—with which the 
Claytons cross-examined Ford's expert witness at length—undermines confidence in the 
jury verdict and warrants a new trial. Tingey v. Christensen, 1999 UT 68, ^ [16, 987 P.2d 
588 ("Errors require reversal only if confidence in the jury's verdict is undermined."). 
The jury viewing the photographs does not warrant a new trial for at least two reasons. 
First, the Claytons attempt to excuse their failure to raise their tampering 
allegation during trial by describing the alleged tampering as "subtle." (AOB at 13.) 
However, if the alleged tampering was so subtle that it was not worth objecting during 
trial—and went undetected by the Claytons' expert during his testimony about the 
latch—then the alleged tampering could not have affected the jury, especially where the 
Claytons cross-examined Dr. Caulfield at length about all of the photographs after they 
now claim to have discovered the alleged tampering.11 
Second, even ignoring the photographs, there is ample evidence to support the 
jury's verdict. To prevail, the Claytons must demonstrate that "the evidence to support 
the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the 
11
 The Claytons have not pointed to a shred of evidence that the latch has been altered, 
other than the innocuous photographs offered at trial. 
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verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618, 621 (Utah 
1987). Here, there is an abundance of evidence that the door latch was not defective, 
even ignoring all the photographs. 
Dr. Caulfield testified that the door latch was subjected to lateral forces in excess 
of 3,000 pounds during the roll sequence, which caused two components of the latch (the 
B-pillar and striker) to rotate outboard approximately 25° in a counter-clockwise 
direction. (R. 11480 at 37-39, 41-42, 84-85.) A videotaped demonstration conducted by 
Packer Engineering on an exemplar vehicle established that it requires only 3,000 pounds 
of lateral force to rotate these latch components 25° outboard. (R. 11480 at 78-85.) 
Damage to another component (the sound dampener on the striker) is also consistent with 
Ford's theory that the latch was overwhelmed, not defective. (R. 11480 at 45-46, 54.) 
Mr. Gilberg then confirmed that the latch was found in a locked position, a position it 
should not have been in under the Claytons' defect theory. (R. 11474 at 215-19.) 
This evidence is sufficient to support the jury's finding of no defect, even 
assuming certain photographs depicting alleged "subtle" tampering never should have 
been admitted. To be clear, there is no evidence of tampering, but assuming there had 
been some error in allowing the jury to view certain photographs, the error would be 
harmless. For this additional reason, the Claytons' tampering argument fails. 
The B-pillar is the vertical structure at the rear of the driver's door. The striker is the 
metal post on the B-pillai that the door latch mechanism attaches to when the door is 
closed. The fork bolts are the door latch components that attach to the striker when the 
door is latched. 
D. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Refusing to Consider 
Mr. Gilberg's Post-Trial Affidavit, Which Was Submitted Ex Parte 
After the Briefing Had Closed 
A subsidiary issue raised as part of the Claytons' tampering argument concerns the 
trial court's refusal to consider Mr. Gilberg's post-trial affidavit, which was submitted ex 
parte after the close of briefing on post-trial motions. (R. 11363-65, 11370.) To succeed 
on this claim, the Claytons must demonstrate that the trial court's refusal to consider the 
affidavit was both an abuse of discretion and harmful. Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307, 
1309 (Utah 1993). Ford will address harmless error first. 
The trial court's refusal to consider the Gilberg affidavit was not harmful because 
the affidavit does not address the alleged tampering, but instead states that Mr. Gilberg 
did not use a metal device to manipulate the door latch to evaluate it during his own 
inspection. (R. 11363-65.) It is difficult to understand how the trial court's refusal to 
consider the affidavit affects the tampering argument, let alone undermines confidence in 
the verdict the jury reached weeks earlier. Tingey, 1999 UT 68 at <|[ 16 ("Errors require 
reversal only if confidence in the jury's verdict is undermined."). Any error was 
harmless. 
Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider the 
affidavit. Ex parte motions are disfavored and reserved for uncontested or expedited 
matters. Utah R. Civ. P. 7. The Claytons' post-trial motions were not only contested and 
not expedited, but they also had been submitted for decision when the Claytons submitted 
the affidavit. Under these circumstances, a trial court's refusal to consider the untimely 
affidavit is not an abuse of discretion. The Claytons' subsidiary issue also fails. 
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II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Excluding The Expert 
Report of a Non-Testifying Expert Witness 
The Claytons' second argument is that the trial court abused its discretion in 
excluding the expert report of Thomas Tiede, Ford's consulting engineer who was never 
deposed and never testified at trial. The trial court excluded the report because the 
Claytons could not lay appropriate foundation through Dr. Caulfield, who neither drafted 
nor assisted in preparation of the report. (R. 11841 at 22-33.) The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the report into evidence, but even if it had, the 
error was harmless, as the information in the report was cumulative of other evidence. 
As with the tampering argument, proper evaluation of this argument requires some 
context. The Claytons have failed to distinguish (i) admission of an expert report and (ii) 
use of the expert report during examination of an expert witness. The opening brief 
argues only that the report itself should have been admitted. (AOB 22, 63.) 
Before trial, the trial court prohibited both parties from referring to non-testifying 
experts. (R. 9582-95.) During trial, the Claytons filed a motion to reconsider this ruling 
with regard to references to the Tiede report. (R. 10235.) The Claytons argued that 
(i) Ford had opened the door to introduction of the Tiede report by mentioning the 
opinion of one of the Claytons' testifying experts during opening argument, and (ii) the 
Claytons should be able to cross-examine Dr. Caulfield about Tiede's report because 
Dr. Caulfield had reviewed the report. (R. 10233-35.) 
After the direct examination of Dr. Caulfield, the trial court heard arguments on 
the Claytons' motion to reconsider. (R. 11481 at 22.) The Claytons again argued that 
(i) Ford had opened the door by mentioning one of the Claytons' other testifying 
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experts, and (ii) Dr. Caulfield had reviewed the Tiede report. (R. 11481 at 23-24.) The 
Claytons then raised an additional argument—that the Tiede report was "impeachment 
evidence." (R. 11481 at 21.) 
The trial court denied the motion to reconsider. First, the trial court ruled that 
Ford had not opened the door to the introduction of the Tiede report in opening statement. 
(R. 11481 at 29.) This ruling has not been appealed. Second, the trial court ruled that the 
Claytons could examine Dr. Caulfield about whatever formed the basis of his opinions, 
but could not examine him about aspects of the Tiede report that did not form the basis of 
his opinions. (R. 11481 at 29.) This ruling also has n6t been appealed. 
The Claytons then asked the trial court to permit them to attempt to lay foundation 
for admission of the Tiede report itself, not for whether the Claytons could examine 
Dr. Caulfield about the Tiede report. (R. 11481 at 30-32.) The trial court allowed the 
examination. At the end of the Claytons' examination of Dr. Caulfield, the Claytons 
moved to admit "the exhibit," meaning the Tiede report. (R. 11481 at 32.) The trial 
court ruled that there was not adequate foundation to admit the Tiede report, as 
Dr. Caulfield had not prepared it. (R. 11481 at 33.) 
In the opening brief, the Claytons do not argue that the trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing to allow them to cross-examine Dr. Caulfield about the Tiede 
report, but instead argue that the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing them "to 
introduce the expert opinion and findings of Mr. Thomas Tiede," or elsewhere, abused its 
13
 The Claytons' argument that Ford had "opened the door" was as follows: "So in 
opening statement Mr. O'Neill tells the jury that we went expert shopping when 
Mr. Ingebresten opined that the outdoor handle operated the latch, so we went and got 
Mr. Gilberg to say that the indoor handle operated the latch." (R. 11481 at 23.) Both 
Mr. Ingebresten and Mr. Gilberg testified at trial. (R. 11464, 11474.) 
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discretion because "the Tiede report [was] admissible as a matter of law." (AOB at 22, 
63.) The Claytons5 sole ground for why the Tiede report should have been admitted is 
that it was "proper impeachment evidence." (AOB at 24.) The Claytons' argument fails 
for a number of reasons. 
First, the Tiede report is inadmissible hearsay.14 Perez v. City of Austin, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36776, *15 (W.D. Tex, May 5, 2008) ("an expert report is generally 
not an admissible document at trial, as it is hearsay[; rjather, it is the expert's testimony, 
not his or her report, that gets presented to the jury"). Therefore, the Tiede report was 
inadmissible under Rule 802 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Second, Dr. Caul field could not provide foundation for admitting the opinions 
contained in the Tiede report—which were not Dr. Caulfield's opinions—because 
Dr. Caulfield did not prepare the report. Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. Norfolk & W. 
Ry., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 476, *10 (4th Cir, January 14, 1999) ("Reports stating an 
expert opinion are not admissible without the preparer being present in court to testify as 
to his qualifications as an expert and to be cross-examined on the substance."). 
Therefore, the Tiede report was inadmissible under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, which requires an expert witness to be qualified and his opinions to be based 
upon accepted scientific principles. Mr. Tiede was not present to testify about either his 
qualification or the bases of his opinions in his report. 
14
 Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61,1fl8, 29 P.3d 1225 (an appellate court may affirm the 
judgment appealed from "if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on 
the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to 
be the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is 
not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not 
considered or passed on by the lower court"). 
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Third, the Tiede report could not be used to impeach Dr. Caulfield, as 
Dr. Caulfield did not prepare the Tiede report. A witness may be impeached with a prior 
inconsistent statement made by that witness, provided that the witness is afforded the 
opportunity to explain or deny his or her statement. Utah R. Evid. 613. In this case, 
however, the Claytons are attempting to impeach Dr. Caulfield with a statement he never 
made and had no role in preparing. Mr. Tiede's opinions cannot be used to challenge 
Dr. Caulfield's honesty or credibility as a witness, and therefore, are not proper 
impeachment evidence to be used against Dr. Caulfield. Glacier Land Co., L.L.C. v. 
Claudia Klawe & Assocs., L.L.C., 2006 UT App 516, ^[29, 154 P.3d 852 (Impeachment 
evidence is "used to undermine a witness's credibility."). The Claytons cite no authority, 
and Ford has located none, suggesting that a witness may be impeached with statements 
in a report prepared by someone else, or, more to the point raised in the opening brief, 
that if a statement could be used to impeach, the report itself would be admissible.15 
Finally, even if the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit the Tiede 
report, the error was harmless because, as demonstrated in the previous section, the 
"other evidence at trial was sufficient to support the jury's verdict." State v. Adams, 955 
P.2d 781, 788 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). There is ample evidence to support the jury's 
finding that the door latch was not defective. 
In addition, insofar as the Tiede report contains anything to support the Claytons' 
theories, the Claytons admit that the substance of the Tiede report is cumulative of other 
15
 In addition, Rule 611 of the Utah Rules of Evidence limits cross-examination to "the 
subject matter raised on direct examination." Ford never raised Mr. Tiede's conclusions 
on direct examination, and consequently, could not have opened the door to introduction 
of this evidence through Dr. Caulfield. 
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evidence presented at trial. (AOB at 24.) The Claytons argue that failing to admit the 
report was prejudicial because it went to credibility: "Tiede worked for Ford for over 
thirty years and designed some of Ford's door latches." (AOB at 24.) As the Claytons 
indicate in the opening brief, however, the Claytons' door latch expert who did testify 
was "a former Ford safety engineer." (AOB at 9.) Thus, the credibility argument cannot 
demonstrate harmful error. More important, credibility is not the issue, as the exclusion 
of evidence cannot warrant a new trial where its substance is cumulative of other 
testimony. State ex rel. SJVL 2007 UT 21, ^58, 154 P.3d 835. Here, the Claytons 
presented the substance of their claim to the jury, who rejected it.16 A new trial is not 
warranted. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the Tiede report from 
evidence. Without Mr. Tiede at trial to testify about his report, it was hearsay and lacked 
foundation. In addition, it could not be used to impeach Dr. Caulfield, as Dr. Caulfield 
did not prepare the report. Finally, considering the lengthy testimony of Dr. Caulfield 
and admissions made by the Claytons' own expert regarding the positioning of the door 
latch, there is no reason to believe that admission of the Tiede report would have changed 
the outcome of the trial. The jury's verdict should be affirmed. 
Moreover, the substance of Mr. Tiede's opinions was rejected by both Dr. Caulfield 
and the Clayton' door latch expert, Mr. Gilberg. Mr. Gilberg's opinion was that when the 
vehicle impacted the ground, a rod in the door compressed, causing the door to unlatch. 
(AOB at 9.) Dr. Caulfield testified that the driver's door opened because the latch was 
overwhelmed from the heavy, unbelted driver smashing against the door during the 
violent rollover. (R. 11480 at 13, 29-30, 44-46, 49-53.) Mr. Tiede adopted neither of 
these opinions. Mr. Tiede concluded that Mr. Clayton opened the door from the inside 
during the accident, an opinion shared by neither party's expert. (R. 11015.) Mr. Tiede 
did conclude, as did Dr. Caulfield, that the door latch was not defective. (R. 11015.) 
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III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Using Ford's Special 
Verdict Form, and the Claytons Waived the Issue By Failing to Offer a Viable 
Alternative Form 
The Claytons' third argument is that the trial court abused its discretion by using a 
special verdict form that did not list separately each of the Claytons9 various defect 
theories. The Claytons contend that the trial court should have asked separate 
interrogatories regarding each alleged defect because "[e]ach of these issues required the 
jury to make individual consideration of the evidence." (AOB at 26.) The Claytons then 
assert that they preserved this objection at pages 116-17 of the February 9, 2007 trial 
transcript, which is attached to the opening brief at addendum 12. (AOB at 27.) 
The Claytons did not preserve this objection. On pages 116-17, the Claytons 
objected to the special verdict form on the following grounds: (i) the form did not list 
separately negligence and failure to warn, something consistent with the trial court's prior 
ruling that these torts are subsumed by strict liability because they all involve a defective 
design;17 (ii) the form did not allow the jury to determine whether there was a breach of 
warranty unless it first finds the product was defective; (iii) the form required the jury 
to find a defect was the proximate cause rather than a cause of the injuries;19 and (iv) the 
17
 This ruling, which has not been appealed, was not an error. Slisze v. Stanley-Bostitch, 
1999 UT 20, TJ12, 979 P.2d 317 (trial court did not err by dismissing negligence claims 
when verdict on strict product claim would be sufficient to compensate the plaintiff). 
The Claytons appear to agree in the opening brief when they state that "[p]roducts 
liability always requires proof of a defective product." (AOB at 27.) 
As a matter of common sense, where the only alleged problem with a product is a 
defective design, a breach of warranty claim cannot succeed unless there is a defect that 
stems from the design. 
The jury was properly instructed as to the definition of "proximate cause," which 
includes both "a cause and effect relationship between the defect and their injury" and 
"the defect must have played a substantial role in causing the injuries and a reasonable 
person could foresee that injury could result from the defect." (R. 10597.) 
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form required the jury to find a specific date on which Ms. Montoya knew about her 
claims against Ford.20 (R. 11483 at 116-17.) 
Because the Claytons did not object to the special verdict form on the ground that 
it failed to list each defect separately, they failed to preserve the issue for appellate 
review.21 Moore v. Smith, 2007 UT App 101, f31, 158 P.3d 562 (to preserve an issue for 
appellate review, a party must timely object to purported errors in the special verdict 
form). For this reason, the court should refuse to reach the merits of the Claytons' special 
verdict argument. 
Even if the Claytons had preserved the issue, however, there is nothing to suggest 
that the trial court abused its wide discretion in posing a single interrogatory concerning 
defect. Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1241 (Utah 1987). Further, there 
is no evidence that the single interrogatory confused the jury, as the Claytons outlined in 
detail each of their separate defect theories in closing argument. (R. 11484 at 68, 70, 78, 
83, 87-88, 89-92, 102-05.) In addition, several jury instructions concerned the Claytons' 
various defect theories. (R. 10572-80.) There is no evidence that the special verdict form 
confused the jurors, let alone confused them sufficiently to warrant a new trial. Even if 
the Claytons had preserved the special verdict argument, the court should reject it. 
There is nothing improper about asking the jury to pinpoint this date for purposes of 
the statute of limitations. 
91 
In addition, the Claytons' proposed special verdict form is not part of the record, even 
though the Claytons refer to it in the opening brief. (AOB at 26.) This proposed form, 
however, could not have provided a basis for the Claytons' argument even if it were part 
of the record. (AOB at 26; Addendum 73.) The Claytons' proposed form also did not 
list each defect theory separately. (AOB at Addendum 73.) Regardless, the court should 
ignore this proposed form because this court denied the Claytons' motion to supplement 
the record with this proposed form. (3/21/2008 Order.) 
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IV- The Trial Court Properly Instructed the Jury on the Law Regarding the 
Manufacturer and Driver's Respective Duties 
The Claytons' fourth claim is that the trial court erred by giving jury instructions 
27, 30, and 31, which pertain to Ford's and Mr. Clayton's respective duties of care. Jury 
instructions provide no basis for reversal where "the instructions taken as a whole fairly 
instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case." Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W. 
RiU 2001 UT 77, ^|38, 31 P.3d 557. Here, each instruction was warranted. 
A. Instruction No. 27 Is Accurate Because Utah Does Not Require a 
Manufacturer to Make a Safe Product Safer 
The Claytons first argue that the trial court erred by giving jury instruction 27, 
which states that Ford only had a duty to make a non-defective product, not a duty to 
make a non-defective product even safer: 
The manufacturer has a duty to design and manufacture a 
product to eliminate any unreasonable risk of foreseeable 
injury. However, there is no duty to make a safe product 
safer. A manufacturer has no duty to refrain from marketing 
a non-defective product when a safer model is available, or to 
inform the consumer of the availability of a safer model. 
(R. 10579.) According to the Claytons, this instruction was improper because it (i) does 
not appear in MUJI, but instead stems from language in a Utah Supreme Court opinion; 
and (ii) unfairly implies that the trial court believed the Explorer was safe. (AOB at 30.) 
The Claytons' first assertion stems from a misunderstanding of the legal status of MUJL 
The Claytons' second assertion is simply incorrect. 
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First, instruction 27 was taken nearly verbatim out of Slisze v. Stanley-Bostitch, 
a Utah Supreme Court case that post-dates the 1995 version of MUJI cited in the opening 
brief. 1999 UT 20, ^[10, 979 P.3d 317. The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly 
reminded litigants that "MUJI are merely advisory and do not necessarily represent 
correct statements of Utah law." Jones v. Cyprus Plateau Mining Corp., 944 P.2d 357, 
359 (Utah 1997). The Claytons' argument that instruction 27 should have reflected 
MUJI, instead of Slisze, therefore incorrectly characterizes the legal status of MUJI. 
Second, instruction 27 does not imply that the trial court believed the Explorer was 
safe. Instead, the instruction informs the jury of the parameters of Ford's duty to make a 
safe product. This case illustrates the importance of instructing the jury that an 
alternative design alone is insufficient to prove defect. The Claytons argued that a 
number of components of the Explorer should have been designed differently. The jury 
easily could have the mistaken impression that if they concluded any of these proposals 
were safer than the existing design, they should find Ford liable. Ford therefore was 
entitled to have the jury instructed—consistent with Slisze—that Ford's duty was to 
market a non-defective product, even if safer options were potentially available. The trial 
court did not err in giving jury instruction 27. 
99 
The language in Slisze is as follows: "In order to prevail on a negligence claim, there 
must be evidence of a duty breached. We have never, nor has any other jurisdiction, 
recognized a duty on the part of a manufacturer to refrain from marketing a non-defective 
product when a safer model is available, or a duty to inform the consumer of the 
availability of the safer model." Id. at [^10. The Tenth Circuit interprets Slisze as the trial 
court did. Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 328 F.3d 1274, 1283 (10th Cir. 2003) ("This 
claim, however, amounts to no more than an argument that even if the riding mower was 
not defective under § 78-15-6(2), it was nevertheless negligent of Sears to market it 
because an alternative safer design was available. Thus, the claim is barred by Slisze."); 
Henrie v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 502 F.3d 1228, 1235 (10th Cir. 2007). 
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B. Jury Instructions 30 and 31 Were Appropriate Because Mr. Clayton 
Was Inattentive, Failed to Recognize Obvious Roadway Conditions, 
and Placed Himself and His Passenger in Danger 
The Claytons next argue that the trial court erred by giving jury instructions 30 
and 31, which outline Mr. Clayton's duties as driver of the vehicle. 
Instruction 30 states: 
The law provides that any person in a motor vehicle on a public 
highway shall keep a proper lookout. A "proper lookout" 
means maintaining the lookout that an ordinarily careful person 
would use in light of all conditions existing at the time and 
those reasonable to be anticipated. A "proper lookout" includes 
a duty to see objects and conditions in plain sight, to see that 
which is open and apparent and to realize obvious dangers. 
This duty does not merely require looking, but observing and 
understanding other traffic and the general situation. 
Instruction 31 states: 
The driver of any vehicle has the duty to exercise reasonable 
care at all times to avoid placing others in danger. 
(R. 10582-83.) 
As an initial matter, assuming the trial court erred in giving these instructions, the 
error was harmless. Instructions 30 and 31 concern negligence, an issue the jury never 
reached because it found that there was no defect. State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, [^20, 20 
P.3d 888 (an error is harmless unless it alters the outcome of the proceedings). 
In addition, the trial court did not err in giving the instructions. The Claytons 
claim that these instructions were improper because "there was absolutely no evidence" 
that Mr. Clayton failed in his duty to keep a look out on the roadway or that he otherwise 
placed his passenger in danger." (AOB at 31-32.) In fact, there was an abundance of 
evidence that Mr. Clayton failed to be attentive, and likely fell asleep at the wheel. 
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First, Trooper Ross Pace, a 25-year veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol who 
investigated the accident, testified that the cause of the accident was driver inattention, 
possibly falling asleep at the wheel. (R. 11479 at 51-52, 54, 59.) Trooper Pace testified 
that Mr. Clayton exited the road at the onset of a gradual curve, precisely the location one 
would expect if he "did not make any type of vehicle maneuver and kept going right 
straight." (Id. at 26.) This evidence, coupled with the lack of marks indicating 
mechanical failure, led Trooper Pace to conclude that "either the driver was asleep or it 
was inattentive driving." (Id. at 54.) 
Second, Dr. Geoff Germane, Ford's accident reconstruction expert, testified that 
the Explorer left the roadway due to driver inattention or distraction. (R. 11462 at 56-57, 
60-61.) Dr. Germane testified that there was no physical evidence suggesting that a 
sudden mechanical error caused the accident, and instead the tire marks on the roadway 
were consistent with a driver who drifted off of the road and overcorrected after realizing 
his mistake. (IcL at 60-61, 70-76.) 
Based on this testimony, there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could 
reasonably conclude that Mr. Clayton failed to observe the gradual curvature in the 
roadway. Similarly, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have 
reasonably concluded that Mr. Clayton failed to exercise reasonable care by driving 
inattentively. Under these circumstances, there was no error in instructing the jury on 
Mr. Clayton's duties as a driver. 
For all of these reasons, the court should reject the jury instruction arguments. 
23
 Ironically, this is precisely what Ms. Montoya's first attorney—Keith Barton— 
concluded after he investigated the accident, which is why he did not file claims against 
Ford. (R.2698.) 
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V. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discrdion in Bifurcating the Liability and 
Damages Phases of the Trial 
The Claytons' fifth argument is that the trial court erred by bifurcating the trial 
into liability and damages phases. In support of this argument, the Claytons claim that 
they were prejudiced because bifurcation prevented them from presenting evidence of 
Kellie Montoya's injuries. (AOB at 32-33.) The Claytons further claim that bifurcation 
prevented the jury from understanding the gravity of the danger posed by the Explorer. 
Id. This argument fails for a number of reasons. 
As an initial matter, any error concerning bifurcation was harmless because the 
jury's only finding was no defect, and the Claytons presented all of their evidence 
concerning defect at trial. State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, ^20, 20 P.3d 888 (an error is 
harmless unless it alters the outcome of the proceedings). Evidence of the injuries in this 
particular case has no relevance to whether the Explorer was defective. 
In addition, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in bifurcating liability and 
damages. It is well-established that the decision to bifurcate a trial falls within a court's 
inherent power to manage its docket, and accordingly, is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238, 1244 (Utah 1998). 
Numerous courts have recognized that product liability lawsuits have a natural separation 
into liability and damages phases.24 The same was true here, where bifurcation benefited 
all parties, the trial court, and the jurors. 
24
 Engebretsen v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 21 F.3d 721, 725 (6th Cir. 1994); Antevski v. 
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 4 F.3d 537, 538 (7th Cir. 1993); Moore v. Subaru 
of Am., 891 F. 2d 1445, 1453 (10th Cir. 1989); Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor, 741 F.2d 
656, 658 (3d Cir. 1984); De Medeiros v. Koehring Co., 709 F.2d 734, 735 (1st Cir. 
1983); Dunn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 639 F.2d 1171,1173 (5th Cir. 1981); Beeckv. 
Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., 562 F.2d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 1977). 
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Before trial, the parties anticipated a six- to eight-week jury trial, which included 
between ten and fifteen damage witnesses. The Claytons identified five damages experts, 
and Ford identified five rebuttal experts. (R. 7005-08.) With these witnesses alone, 
bifurcation saved approximately ten days of trial. The accompanying costs savings and 
reduction of hardship to the jurors was reason alone to bifurcate. In addition, bifurcation 
eliminated the possibility that the liability verdict would be driven by emotion, as 
opposed to an objective review of the engineering evidence. Hines v. Joy Mfg. Co., 850 
F.2d 1146, 1153 (6th Cir. 1988). 
The Claytons nonetheless assert that bifurcation prevented them from informing 
the jury about "the gravity of the danger" posed by the Explorer because they could not 
introduce evidence of Ms. Montoya's injuries that resulted from the rollover in this case. 
(AOB at 33.) This assertion is inaccurate, and, ironically, contradicts the Claytons5 
assertion later in the opening brief (issue 10) that the trial court erred by admitting 
evidence of the severity of the rollover. (AOB at 53-55.) While no expert witnesses 
testified about the nature of damages, the jury was informed that Mr. Clayton died during 
the accident and Ms. Montoya testified at length about her injuries. (R. 11478 at 14-16.) 
Therefore, the jury was aware of the extent of Ms. Montoya's injuries. Regardless, 
Ms. Montoya's specific injuries in this accident are not relevant to whether the Explorer 
was defective. 
For these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by bifurcating the trial 
into liability and damages phases. 
VI. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Excluding Certain 
Engineering Documents that Related to Earlier Model Designs and Unrelated 
Defects 
The Claytons' sixth claim is that the trial court erred by excluding certain 
documents pertaining to the Bronco II and UN46, earlier model SUVs that predated by 
several years the Explorer at issue in this case, the UN 105. The Claytons claim that these 
documents are probative of Ford's "notice of a particular defect, the magnitude of the 
defect or danger involved, and the defendants' ability to correct the known defect." 
(AOB at 36.) The trial court excluded the documents as irrelevant and unduly prejudicial 
because they relate to defects that are not alleged in the Claytons' complaint, and 
consequently, would be confusing to the jury. (R. 11476 at 56.) 
As an initial matter, any error was harmless. The jury found that there was no 
defect, and thus, Ford could not have been on notice of a defect, let alone on notice of the 
magnitude of a defect or that a defect needed to be remedied. State v. Evans, 2001 UT 
22, f20, 20 P.3d 888 (an error is harmless unless it alters the outcome of the 
proceedings). Therefore, under the Claytons' theory concerning the relevance of the 
documents, any error was harmless. 
In addition, the trial court did not abuse its "considerable discretion" in excluding 
the documents. Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 2001 UT 107, ^[95, 37 P.3d 1130. 
In the opening brief, the Claytons claim that the Bronco II and UN46 model vehicles are 
one-in-the-same as the Explorer at issue in this case. In fact, the Claytons go so far as to 
claim that the Explorer is nothing more than a "renamed" Bronco II. (AOB at 35.) In 
reality, the Explorer is a different vehicle from the earlier model Bronco II and UN46 
referenced in the opening brief. It is important to understand the key differences. 
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A. The History of the Bronco II and UN46 Model Lines and Their 
Differences From the Clayton UNI05 Explorer 
Ford introduced the Explorer in model year 1991. The first generation of 
Explorers was designated under a program known as UN46, which encompasses all 
1991-1994 model year Explorers. In 1995, Ford made substantial changes to the design 
of the Explorer, which resulted in a new program known as UNI 05. The Explorer driven 
by Ms. Clayton came from the UN 105 program. 
At trial, the Claytons not only attempted to introduce evidence regarding the 
UN46 Explorer, but also attempted to introduce documents regarding the Bronco II, a 
smaller, lighter vehicle that was no longer offered after 1990. By way of reference, the 
vehicles referenced by the Claytons at trial were sold by Ford as follows: 
BRONCO II 1983 to 1990 N/A 
UN46 EXPLORER 1991 to 1994 "First Generation" 
UN105 EXPLORER 1995 to 1997 "Second Generation" 
(Clayton Explorer) 
UN150 EXPLORER 1998 to 2001 "Second Generation" 
There are several important design differences between the UN 105 Explorer at 
issue here and the earlier model SUVs sold by Ford. An affidavit outlining these 
differences is located at Addendum F. The Bronco II was narrower, shorter, and lighter 
than the Clayton Explorer, with completely different suspension and steering 
components. (R. 7047-48.) In particular, the Bronco II was sold with Twin I-Beam 
suspension, coil springs in front of the vehicle, and overslung leaf springs in the rear. 
The Explorer driven by Mr. Clayton, in contrast, was constructed with a Short Long Arm 
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suspension, torsion bar springs in the front of the vehicle, and underslung leaf springs in 
the rear. Numerous other components of the two designs are different as well, including 
the axles, spindles, shock absorbers, stabilizer bars, brackets, and brake assemblies. (Id.) 
These design differences not only distinguish the Bronco II and UN 105 in their 
blueprints, but also result in substantially different handling and stability. (R. 7047.) 
In addition to the steering and suspension differences, the Bronco II and UN 105 
also diverge in their designs. The Bronco II (manufactured from 1983-1990) was 
available only as a two-door vehicle, while the Explorer was sold with both four-door and 
two-door options. The Bronco II was offered only with smaller tires of the P195/75R15 
or P205/70R15 vintage, while the UN105 Explorer was tested, marketed, and sold with 
225/70R15, P235/75R15, and P255/70R16 tires.25 (R. 7048.) The differences in the 
designs of the two vehicles result in different handling and performance characteristics. 
The differences between the UN46 Explorer and UNI05 (Clayton) Explorer 
models are also significant. The UN46 utilizes the older-style Twin I-Beam front 
suspension which functions differently from the UN 105 Short Long Arm suspension. 
The UN46 and UN 105 also have different rear suspensions, frames, spindles, and springs. 
(R. 7048.) Most important, the components of the UNI 05 that the Claytons alleged were 
defective were different than the components on the UN46. In particular, the UN46 was 
constructed with a 23 mm front stabilizer bar, while the Clayton UN 105 Explorer utilized 
a 36.3 mm front stabilizer bar. The UN46 also utilized a recirculating ball steering 
system, while the UNI05 utilizes a rack and pinion steering system. (R. 7048-49.) 
The court should reject the Claytons' assertions that the UN46 Explorer was unstable 
with P235 tires. The Claytons could not substantiate this claim despite attempting to do 
so for more than 7 years. The Explorer was tested with P235 tires, and it passed the tests. 
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B. The Trial Court Properly Concluded that the Bronco II and UN46 
Documents Were Irrelevant and Prejudicial 
Rule 402 provides that "evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." Utah 
R. Evid. 402. Further, even where evidence is relevant, it "may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issue, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.55 Utah R. Evid. 403. 
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Bronco II and UN46 
documents because these vehicles and prototypes are fundamentally different from the 
Clayton Explorer. Gilbert v. Cosco. Inc.. 989 F.2d 399, 404-05 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(upholding trial court's decision to preclude evidence of different models with different 
designs as unfairly prejudicial). The trial court conducted a full-day evidentiary hearing 
during the trial to consider each proffered document on an individual basis. At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ruled that admitting documents about vehicles 
with components different from those alleged to be defective in this lawsuit would cause 
"confusion of the jury." (R. 11476 at 55-56.) The trial court therefore excluded the 
documents as irrelevant under Rule 402 and overly prejudicial under Rule 403.2? (Id.) 
After ruling that the documents were inadmissible, the trial court provided the 
Claytons an opportunity to establish a link between the documents and their defect 
claims, but they could not. (Id. at 57.) This alone demonstrates that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in excluding the documents under Rules 402 and 403. 
26
 Jordan v. General Motors Corp., 624 F. Supp. 72, 78 (E.D. La. 1985) (excluding as 
irrelevant evidence of dissimilar defects in other make, year and model GM vehicles). 
27
 The Claytons cite Buell-Wilson, a California case, as if it were somehow binding on 
the trial court and this court. (AOB at 39.) California cases have no such effect. The 
trial court based its decision on the arguments and evidence presented in this case. 
VII. The Trial Court Did Not Err By Directing Verdict on the Claytons' Fraud 
Claim Because the Claytons Did Not Review or Rely Upon Any Allegedly 
Fraudulent Statements 
The Claytons' seventh claim is that the trial court erred by directing a verdict on 
their common law fraud claim. In support of this claim, the Claytons raise three 
arguments: (i) directed verdict would have been improper had the Claytons been 
permitted to introduce certain Ford advertisements; (ii) evidence of a Ford advertisement 
and brochure that was admitted was sufficient to proceed to the jury on the fraud claim; 
and (iii) directed verdict was improper because Ford fraudulently failed to disclose that 
the Explorer should use only P235 tires. (AOB at 43-45.) All three arguments fail. 
First, any error was harmless because the jury found that the Explorer was not 
defective, and therefore, the fraud claims would have failed even if they had not been 
dismissed. State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, ^|20, 20 P.3d 888 (an error is harmless unless it 
alters the outcome of the proceedings). If the product was not defective, then (i) the 
advertising suggesting the Explorer was safe was not misleading and (ii) there was no 
defect to disclose, including any defect involving tires. 
Second, the trial court did not err in dismissing the Claytons' common law fraud 
claim. In Utah, common law fraud requires clear and convincing proof that a false 
representation was made which was reasonably relied on by a plaintiff to his detriment. 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991). Thus, for a fraud claim to 
survive, there must be evidence of the plaintiffs reliance upon the alleged 
misrepresentation. Robinson v. Tripco Inv., Inc., 2000 UT App 200, ^|19, 21 P.3d 219. 
While the question of reliance is often a matter for the jury, "there are instances where 
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courts may conclude that as a matter of law, there was no reasonable reliance." Id. All 
three of the Claytons' arguments fail under this standard. 
The Claytons' first argument is that they should have been permitted to introduce 
a series of national commercial and print advertisements implying that the Explorer was 
safe. (AOB at 43-44.) This evidence was properly excluded because during direct 
examination by the Claytons' counsel, Fred Clayton could not, and did not, testify that he 
had reviewed, let alone relied upon, any of these advertisements. (R. 11488 at 7-8.) For 
example, when the Claytons' counsel asked Fred Clayton whether he had seen an "ad 
which contains a moose, and . . . another which contains Green Acres," Mr. Clayton 
responded that he could not "recall specifically seeing those." (R. 11459 at 13.) In the 
opening brief, the Claytons do not cite any testimony that calls the trial court's exclusion 
of this evidence into question. 
The Claytons' second argument is that the following evidence—which Mr. 
Clayton did view prior to purchasing the Explorer—is sufficient to preclude directed 
verdict: (i) a one-page advertisement with the words "Built Ford Tough" and (ii) an 
Explorer brochure listing the available colors, interior packages, and options for the 
vehicle. (R. 11488 at 28.) Fred Clayton confirmed on cross-examination that these were 
the only materials he recalled viewing prior to purchase. (R. 11459 at 51.) Based on this 
28
 The Claytons also take issue with the exclusion of proposed trial exhibit 482G, which 
is a press release from the Utah Attorney General announcing a $51.5 million settlement 
with Ford arising out of the Firestone tire recall and subsequent litigation. This document 
was inadmissible for a host of reasons, the most obvious of which is that it is evidence of 
an offer to compromise under Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The document 
was also irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial because it pertained entirely to a defect 
allegation not at issue in this case. The Clayton vehicle was not equipped with Firestone 
tires and was not alleged to have a tire detread problem. 
testimony, the trial court appropriately determined that the Claytons could not prevail on 
their fraud claim. The advertisement and brochure contain no representations relating to 
the vehicle's door latch, roof strength, seat belts, rollover resistance, or any of the other 
defect claims at issue in this trial. More important, the Claytons' own marketing expert, 
O.C. Ferrell, could not identify any fraudulent statement in the brochure or "Built Ford 
Tough" logo. (R. 11458.) The trial court did not err in dismissing the Claytons' fraud 
claim. 
The Claytons' third argument is that Ford failed to disclose that the Explorer 
should have been used only with P215 tires, instead of the P235 tires sold with the 
vehicle. (AOB at 46-47.) Even if the Claytons were correct in their tire theory—which 
they are not—Mr. Clayton never testified that had he been told that P215 tires should be 
used, he would not have purchased the Explorer with its standard P235 tires. (R. 11459 
at 16.) Mr. Clayton did not even testify that he would have changed the tires had he been 
told that the P215 would have been more appropriate. Instead, counsel for the Claytons 
only asked Mr. Clayton whether the salesperson told him that it was supposed to have 
smaller tires on it, to which Mr. Clayton answered "No." (Id.) Thus, even if the Explorer 
should have had smaller tires—a claim for which there is no evidence29—the trial court 
did not err in dismissing the Claytons' fraud claim. There is no evidence of reliance. 
All three of the Claytons' directed verdict arguments fail. 
As Ford's expert, Don Tandy, testified, the Explorer was a stable and well-designed 
vehicle regardless of the tire option, as the Explorer passed tests with a variety of tire 
options, including the P235 tires. (R. 11482 at 45-47.) 
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VIII. The Trial Court Did Not Coerce the Jury's Verdict and Any Objection Was 
Waived 
The Claytons' eighth claim is that the trial court "coerced" a jury verdict by 
sequestering the jury during mid-afternoon on a Friday. (AOB at 47-48.) This argument 
also fails for a number of reasons. 
First, the Claytons never objected during the jury's deliberations and, therefore, 
the issue is waived. State v. King, 2006 UT 3, f 13, 131 P.3d 202. 
Second, the jury also never expressed any concern about deliberating into the 
evening. This also is dispositive. The Claytons characterize this issue as one of first 
impression, but the Utah Supreme Court has addressed it. State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, 25 
P.3d 985. In Boyd, the jury began deliberations shortly after 5:00 p.m. and returned a 
verdict five or six hours later. On appeal, Mr. Boyd asserted that the trial court had erred 
by not advising the jurors that they could adjourn and return the next day, a failure 
Mr. Boyd characterized—like the Claytons—as "coercing" a verdict. Id. at T|47. 
The Supreme Court rejected Boyd's contention on the following grounds: 
(i) Boyd did not object to the failure to advise the jurors they could adjourn; (ii) only one 
juror expressed concern about the late hour; (iii) the jury never reported any difficulties in 
reaching a verdict; and (iv) the jury did not express a desire to halt deliberations for the 
evening. Id. at ^[48. The facts here present even less of a problem. The Claytons never 
objected, and no juror (i) complained about the late hour, (ii) expressed any difficulty in 
reaching a verdict, or (iii) asked to halt deliberations. The court should reject the 
Claytons' jury coercion argument. 
on 
The record reveals no coercion on the part of the trial court. While the jury heard 
several hours of instructions and closing arguments the day they began deliberations, the 
jury did not—as the opening brief suggests—work straight through without a break. 
IX. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Allowing Juror No. 3 to Remain on the Jury 
Where the Claytons Agreed that a Jury Instruction Was Sufficient 
The Claytons' ninth claim is that the trial court committed plain error by failing to 
voir dire a juror who expressed discontent during the first week of trial. (AOB at 51.) 
The Claytons claim that the trial court should have questioned the juror further to 
determine whether he could remain fair and impartial in the proceedings. (AOB at 52.) 
By raising this issue under the plain error standard, the Claytons admit that this issue was 
not preserved. However, what the opening brief fails to disclose is that the alleged error 
was not just waived, but was invited by the Claytons. 
Under Utah law, "[t]he doctrine of invited error prohibits a party from setting up 
an error at trial and then complaining of it on appeal." Miller v. Martineau & Co., 1999 
UT App 216, ^42, 983 P.2d 1107. Even where the error is plain, it is beyond appellate 
review when invited. State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, fU, 63 P.3d 731 ("this court will 
review issues not raised below for plain error, unless the defendant invited the error at 
trial"). Here, the record reveals that the Claytons approved of the trial court's remedy 
and therefore invited any error. 
Before trial, both parties questioned juror Lam Thai and were aware of the 
economic hardship trial imposed on him. (R. 11468 at 115.) During the first week of 
(AOB at 48.) The jury was given a break between jury instructions and the start of the 
Claytons' closing argument, was given a second break prior to the start of Ford's closing 
argument, and was given a third break between Ford's closing and the Claytons' rebuttal 
argument. (R. 11484 at 33, 108; R. 11483 at 84.) The jury also had snacks and 
beverages available to them in the jury room throughout the day. When the trial judge 
specifically asked the jury whether they would like a lunch break, the jury's preference 
was to continue with closings. (R. 11483 at 3.) The jury then ordered dinner during their 
deliberations, and returned a verdict after about seven hours. The record contains no 
evidence that the jury, the Claytons, Ford, or the trial court had any objection to how the 
jury deliberated until the Claytons raised the issue after an adverse verdict. 
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trial, the bailiff overheard a comment made by Mr. Thai regarding the process, which the 
bailiff properly reported to the trial judge. (R. 11466 at 3-4.) Mr. Thai's comment 
expressed exasperation with being on the jury and was, "You guys all know what I think 
already." (R. 11466 at 4.) Mr. Thai never indicated what it was that he already thought. 
The trial court promptly reported the comment to counsel and solicited their views on 
how to best handle the situation. (Id.) 
Tellingly, the Claytons never moved for a mistrial or to disqualify the juror based 
upon his comments. Moreover, when the trial judge asked the Claytons' counsel whether 
he believed that additional questioning of the juror was needed, the Claytons suggested 
an instruction was sufficient: I would "suggest a personal admonition. That's - an 
example maybe of bringing him in first and saying, Mr. Thai, you know you're not 
supposed to do that. That may be best here, perhaps. Just a thought." (R. 11466 at 5-6.) 
Later, after additional discussion, the trial court and the parties decided that the 
best approach would be to give the entire jury a cautionary instruction that the jury 
should not form any opinions or conclusions without first hearing all of the evidence. 
The Claytons approved the use of the specific instruction, located at R 11466 at 19-22: 
THE COURT: And Mr. Emblem, Mr. O'Neill, let - would 
there be any objection if I gave the first six paragraphs, the 
first six numbered paragraphs and read that to the jury again? 
MR. O'NEILL: I have no objection, your Honor. And I can 
show that to Mr. Emblem, if he -
MR. EMBLEM: Yeah. 
MR. O'NEILL: - wants to review it again. 
MR. EMBLEM: I have no objection. That's exactly the right 
language. 
(R. 11466 at 9-10 (emphasis added).) 
After the cautionary instruction, the trial proceeded without interruption for six 
weeks. During that time, there were no complaints raised by Mr. Thai or any other juror 
on the panel, nor were any objections raised by the Claytons regarding the composition of 
the jury. When the Claytons agreed that the instruction would remedy any error, they 
invited the very error (which is not an error at all) they now allege on appeal—that the 
instruction was insufficient and the juror should have been questioned (not just 
instructed) individually. The decision to allow a juror to remain on a panel was not an 
abuse of discretion. Hardin v. Bell 2002 UT 108, T|14, 57 P.3d 1093. 
Further, to the extent that the issue is preserved and the trial court abused its 
discretion, the error is harmless because the Claytons can provide no evidence that 
additional questioning of Mr. Thai would have affected the outcome of the trial. 
Although the Claytons speculate that Mr. Thai was biased in favor of Ford, additional 
voir dire may have dispelled this belief or even revealed that he was biased in favor of the 
Claytons. There is no reason to speculate that Mr. Thai failed to observe the trial court's 
cautionary instruction, or that he would have voted differently had the Claytons 
conducted additional voir dire. More important, there is no evidence that the jury would 
have reached a different outcome had Mr. Thai been replaced by an alternate juror. 
The Claytons agreed to the course taken by the trial court, and therefore, any error 
was invited and the issue is not preserved for appeal. In addition, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in allowing the juror to remain on the jury. Finally, any error was 
harmless, as there is no evidence that the juror failed to follow the instruction the 
Claytons agreed the trial court should give. 
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X. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Allowing Ford to Introduce 
a Statistical Chart Demonstrating that the Clayton Accident was Among the 
Top 1% of AH Rollovers in Terms of Severity 
The Claytons' tenth claim is that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing 
Ford to introduce evidence concerning the statistical severity of the rollover. The exhibit 
at issue was a chart generated from publicly-available data maintained by the United 
States Department of Transportation that tracks the number of rollovers occurring in the 
United States each year and categorizes them by their severity. (AOB at 53-54.) The 
chart illustrates that the Clayton accident—which involved four complete rolls—ranked 
within the 99th percentile in terms of accident severity. (R. 11462 at 112-114.) 
Although the chart was prepared by Ford's accident reconstructionist, Dr. Geoff 
Germane, it was introduced through the Claytons' expert, David Ingebretsen, without any 
O 1 
objection. (AOB at Addendum 18; Ford Ex. 457.) Thus, the issue is not preserved for 
appeal. State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, %9, 46 P.3d 230. 
In addition, there was no abuse of discretion in admitting this chart into evidence. 
At trial, the Claytons claimed that Tony Clayton would have survived if the Explorer's 
occupant protection systems had been designed differently. The chart responded to this 
claim by demonstrating that the Clayton accident was extremely severe. (R. 11462 at 
112-114.) Therefore, the chart was relevant. 
The Claytons failed to make the transcript relevant to the introduction of this evidence 
part of the appellate record. However, had they done so, the record would demonstrate 
that Mr. Ingebretsen testified that the statistics were available in a published SAE paper 
and are included with this body of research routinely relied upon by mechanical 
engineers. The record would further demonstrate that the document was introduced 
through Mr. Ingebretsen with no objection. The only record evidence indicating the 
introduction of Exhibit 457 is the exhibit list kept by the clerk, which reveals that it was 
introduced through Mr. Ingebresten without objection. (AOB at Addendum 18.) 
The chart also was not misleading, contrary to the Claytons5 suggestion in their 
opening brief. (AOB at 54.) The chart was based on widely accepted and reliable data 
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The Claytons argue that Dr. Germane's testimony about the chart was improper 
because the statistics included rollover accidents involving "dissimilar" vehicles, such as 
pickups, vans, SUVs, and passenger cars. The Claytons, however, misunderstand the 
purpose of the testimony. Dr. Germane did not attempt to draw any comparisons 
between the causes of these accidents or how these various vehicles performed. 
(R. 11462 at 112-14.) Rather, the data was offered for the discrete purpose of providing 
the jury with context regarding the severity of this rollover. 
The Claytons waived any objection to the admission of the chart. In addition, the 
chart was properly admitted because it contained information relevant to the Claytons' 
claims. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the chart. 
XI. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Allowing Irwiftf t I\icc l<» 
Testify About His Conclusions Regarding the Accident 
The Claytons' eleventh claim is that the trial court abused its discretion by 
allowing Trooper Ross Pace to testify about his conclusions regarding the accident. 
(AOB at 55-61.) The Claytons claim that Trooper Pace's testimony was lacking in 
foundation. It was not. 
As an initial matter, any error was harmless and invited. First, counsel for the 
Claytons solicited testimony from his client, Fred Clayton, that Trooper Pace told 
Mr. Clayton that his son fell asleep or was otherwise inattentive, drifted off the road, 
corrected too sharply, and was not wearing his seat belt. (R. 11459 at 26-27.) These are 
the very conclusions that the Claytons now argue should have been excluded. (AOB at 
found in the NASS databases and statistics published by the United States of Department 
of Transportation. (R. 9036.) Dr. Germane merely reported findings from the scientific 
literature and governmental databases that are accepted within his profession. 
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56-57.) Second, the Claytons introduced Mr. Pace's accident report as plaintiffs' exhibit 
22, a report that lists the driver being "asleep" and '"unrestrained." (R. 11479 at 16.) 
Thus, any error was (i) harmless, because the evidence was cumulative of other evidence, 
and (ii) invited, because the Claytons introduced the very evidence they claim should 
have been excluded. State v. Adams, 955 P.2d 781, 788 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (an 
erroneous evidentiary ruling is harmless where "other evidence at trial was sufficient to 
support the jury's verdict"); Miller v. Martineau & Co., 1999 UT App 216, f!2, 983 P.2d 
1107 ("The doctrine of invited error prohibits a party from setting up an error at trial and 
then complaining of it on appeal."). 
The Claytons also waived this issue by failing to object at trial as to the foundation 
of Trooper Pace's testimony. (R. 11479 at 54.) Under Utah law, foundational defects, 
unless timely objected to, are deemed waived and the evidence is deemed competent. 
State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1200 (Utah 1984). If the Claytons believed that 
foundation had not been properly laid, they were obligated to object so that the trial court 
could rule on the objection and, if necessary, allow Ford to ask additional questions to lay 
foundation for the answers. State v. John, 667 P.2d 2, 33-34 (Utah 1983) (timely 
objection required under "contemporaneous objection" rule and therefore objection "a 
day after the testimony" does not preserve the issue for appeal). Instead, the Claytons 
waited until the end of their cross-examination, and then moved to "strike the entire 
testimony of Officer Pace, or opinions which border on expert opinions." (R. 11479 at 
94.) The motion was properly overruled. 
33
 In addition, the Claytons' claim fails on its merits. The Claytons' concerns regarding 
Trooper Pace's testimony ultimately pertain to the weight, not admissibility. The 
opening brief focuses on alleged mistakes committed by Trooper Pace during his 
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Finally, Trooper Pace provided sufficient foundational testimony to support his 
findings from the accident investigation. Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 733 (Utah 
1982) (affirming decision of trial court to admit investigating police officer's description 
of how the accident occurred); Batt v. Utah, 503 P.2d 855, 857-58 (Utah 1972) (holding 
that a police officer trained and experienced in accident investigation was competent to 
make characterizations of the accident scene). Trooper Pace testified that he has both 
advanced training in accident investigation/reconstruction and personal knowledge of the 
Clayton accident scene investigation. (R. 11479 at 5-16.) He further testified that he has 
specific training in analyzing tire marks at the accident, in calculating speeds at issue in 
the accident, and in evaluating whether an accident was caused by an inattentive or asleep 
driver. (Id.) 
During Trooper Pace's career he investigated numerous single vehicle rollover 
accidents involving inattentive or asleep drivers. (Id.) He described the types of 
"markers" that investigating officers look for in identifying inattentive driving, including 
evidence that "the tire is turning and it's free flowing, [a]nd then all of a sudden, you will 
see that the vehicle is turned back." (R. 11479 at 15.) According to Trooper Pace, "you 
can see exactly when [a driver] decided he better get back on the road or he better slam 
on his brakes." (Id.) When asked whether he applied "that experience and training in 
investigating the Clayton accident," Trooper Pace testified that he did. (R. 11479 at 16.) 
investigation, such as failing to interview a witness identified by the Claytons, not 
knowing how far apart "rumble strips" are on the side of the roadway, and failing to take 
an inventory of debris at the scene. (AOB at 55-56.) The Claytons were given a full 
opportunity to cross-examine Trooper Pace about these purported deficiencies in his 
investigation and to bring out any inconsistencies in his findings. (R. 11479 at 60-94.) 
These concerns do not affect the admissibility of the testimony. 
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Likewise, Trooper Pace had training in investigating seat belt usage to determine 
whether a seat belt was in use at the time of the accident. Trooper Pace, like all traffic 
accident investigators, was required to determine whether the occupants of the vehicle 
were using their seat belts for purposes of filling out his standardized report for the Utah 
Department of Public Safety. He testified that he determined that Mr. Clayton was not 
wearing his seat belt at the time of the accident because the seat belt was working 
properly and Mr. Clayton had been ejected from the vehicle. (R. 11479 at 47-48.) The 
photographs of the seat belt area taken by Trooper Pace at the scene further corroborated 
his inspection findings. (R. 11479 at 47.) 
Even if the Claytons had timely objected, the objection would have been properly 
overruled because Utah routinely admits testimony from police officers regarding their 
accident investigation findings. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
XII. There Was No Cumulative Error Committed By the Trial Court 
Finally, the Claytons argue that the jury's verdict should be reversed because of 
cumulative error by the trial court. As indicated above, the trial court did not commit any 
error in making the eleven rulings identified by the Claytons in their opening brief. For 
these reasons, the jury's verdict should be affirmed. 
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CROSS-APPEAL 
Ford conditionally cross-appeals (i) the jury's finding that Kellie Montoya first 
learned of her claims against Ford more than a year after she filed her claims against Ford 
and (ii) the trial court's denial of Ford's motion for summary judgment in which Ford 
demonstrated that Ms. Montoya's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Unless 
the court reverses the jury's verdict, there is no need for the court to address the issues 
raised in this cross-appeal. 
I. There Is No Substantia] Evidence to Support the Jury's Finding that 
Ms- Montoya First Discovered Her Claims Against Ford After She Filed Her 
Claims Against Ford 
There is no evidence to support the jury's finding that "the date upon which Kellie 
Montoya knew, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, 
both her harm and its cause [was] October 25, 2003." (R. 10610.) To satisfy the 
marshaling requirement, Ford submits that the only event in evidence that took place on 
October 25, 2003, is just what the jury identified on the special verdict form, 
Ms. Montoya's deposition in this case. (R. 10610.) A copy of the special verdict form is 
located at Addendum C. 
The jury's finding cannot be correct. Ms. Montoya filed her complaint against 
Ford on January 23,2002, more than a year before the date the jury found that she 
discovered her claims against Ford. Therefore, the jury's finding is "against the clear 
weight of the evidence, thus making [it] 'clearly erroneous.'" In re Estate of BartelL 776 
P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). The court should vacate the jury's finding. 
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IL Ms. Montoya's Claims Are Barred by the Two-Year Statute of Limitations 
The court should also hold that the trial court erred in denying Ford's motion for 
summary judgment because Ms. Montoya's claims are barred by the statute of 
limitations.34 The Utah Product Liability Act provides that a civil action based upon an 
alleged defect in a product "shall be brought within two years from the time the 
individual who would be the claimant in such action discovered, or in the exercise of due 
diligence should have discovered, both the harm and its cause." Utah Code Ann. § 78-
15-3 (2001).35 
Here, the accident occurred on November 27, 1998. Ms. Montoya retained an 
attorney on April 13, 1999, to represent her with regard to all claims stemming from the 
accident. (R. 2642, 2734,11478 at 41-44.) Yet Ms. Montoya did not file her complaint 
against Ford until May 14, 2002, more than three years after either of these dates. (R. 
314; 442.) Ms. Montoya's claims against Ford are therefore barred by the statute of 
limitations unless the statutory discovery rule applies to save her claim. 
The statutory discovery rule applies only if Ms. Montoya did not have "actual or 
constructive knowledge of the relevant facts forming the basis of the cause of action" 
Where a trial court errs "in declining to rule as a matter of law" in a summary judgment 
motion, the court will review the denial of a motion for summary judgment on appeal. 
Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc., 2007 UT App 382,11(13-14, 174 P.3d 1. Under 
Utah law, the applicability of the discovery rule presents a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, [^32, 44 P.3d 742. 
Or 
The Utah Products Liability Act is meant to apply to "any claims against a 
manufacturer, based on a defective product." Strickland v. General Motors Corp., 852 F. 
Supp. 956, 959 (D. Utah 1994); see also McCollin v. Svnthes Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 
1122 (D. Utah 1999) (holding that § 78-15-3 applies to claims of strict liability, 
negligence per se, negligence and breach of warranty when claims arise from an allegedly 
defective product). 
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until after May 14, 2000, two years prior to her filing her complaint against Ford. Russell 
Packard Dev.. Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ^ |22, 108 P.3d 741. In this case, the discovery 
rule does not apply because at the time of the accident Ms. Montoya knew both about her 
injuries and that Ford manufactured the Explorer. At the very least, these two facts put 
Ms. Montoya "on notice to make further inquiry if [she] harbor[ed] doubts or questions 
about the defendant's actions." Park City Mines v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 
889 (Utah 1993). Ms. Montoya did not need to discover "every last detail of [her] 
claims," id,, as "mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action does not prevent the 
running of the statute of limitations." O'Neal v. Division of Family Servs., 821 P.2d 
1139, 1143 (Utah 1991).36 
For this reason, under the Utah Product Liability Act, the statute of limitations 
begins to run when a plaintiff discovers the identity of the manufacturer of the allegedly 
defective product. Aragon v. Clover Club Foods Co., 857 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). As one court has explained, it would be an "extremely dangerous rule of law that 
the accrual date of a cause of action is held in abeyance indefinitely until a prospective 
plaintiff obtains professional assistance to determine the existence of a possible cause of 
action." Sedlak v. Ford Motor Co.. 235 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Mich. App. 1975) (holding that 
plaintiff knew on date of injury that a tire jack was involved when a truck fell on his 
head). Because Ms. Montoya knew at the time of the accident that Ford manufactured 
the Explorer, the discovery rule cannot save her claim/' (R. 2639-42.) 
36
 Hazel v. General Motors Corp.. 863 F. Supp. 435, 438 n.8 (W.D. Ky. 1994) (holding 
that where a consumer knew that a fuel-fed fire caused his injuries, he undoubtedly could 
have learned about the more precise mechanism or defect had he consulted an attorney). 
Cases in other jurisdictions also support this conclusion. Hickman v. Electro-Magic, 
Inc., 358 S.E.2d 810, 814 (W.Va. 1987) (plaintiffs claim against air tank manufacturer 
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At the very least, Ms. Montoya knew, or should have known, about her claims 
against Ford in 1999 when she hired local attorney Keith Barton to represent her with 
respect to "claims against all parties arising out of injuries which occurred on or about the 
27th day of November, 1998." (R. 2642; 2734; 11478 at 67-69 (emphasis added).) 
Mr. Barton agreed to represent Ms. Montoya "against any parties that were discovered to 
be at fault in the accident." (R. 2642; 2734.) On March 9,1999, Ms. Montoya sent a 
letter to the Fred Clayton's insurance company requesting compensation for her injuries 
sustained in the accident. (R. 2639; 2688; 11478 at 41-44.) Mr. Barton obtained a 
settlement of $85,000 for Ms. Montoya from the insurance company, which was 
memorialized in a formal settlement agreement and release dated June 29, 1999. 
(R. 2642; 2739; 11478 at 73.) At this point, there is no question that Ms. Montoya was 
"on notice to make further inquiry if [she] harbor[ed] doubts or questions about the 
defendant's actions." Park City Mines v. Greater Park City Co.. 870 P.2d 880, 889 (Utah 
1993). 
Assuming Ms. Montoya's claims against Ford have any basis—which they do 
not—Mr. Barton's failure to file a claim against Ford on Ms. Montoya's behalf may 
constitute malpractice, but it does not toll the statute of limitations. Mr. Barton 
interviewed Ms. Montoya and her parents about the accident and Ms. Montoya's injuries, 
an interview in which Ms. Montoya identified the vehicle as a Ford Explorer. (R. 2641; 
2697; 2703.) Mr. Barton also obtained and reviewed a copy of the police report 
accrued at the time an air tank exploded injuring plaintiff); Buettgen v. Volkswagenwerk, 
A.G., 505 F. Supp. 84, 87 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (where a plaintiff is injured in an 
automobile manufactured by a particular defendant, it is irrelevant that a plaintiff did not 
learn of the particular nature of a cause of action for an alleged defective design until 
later). 
concerning the accident, which also identifies the vehicle as a Ford Explorer. (R. 2641; 
2700; 2703.) In fact, Mr. Barton even inspected the vehicle. (R. 2703-04.) After 
gathering this evidence, Mr. Barton concluded—as did the jury years later—that the 
driver, not the vehicle, was the cause of the accident. (R. 2641; 2698.) 
Other jurisdictions consider consulting an attorney—let alone retaining counsel, 
obtaining a settlement, and inspecting the product—to be conclusive evidence that the 
statute of limitations has begun to run. For example, the Seventh Circuit has interpreted a 
similar Illinois statute of limitations to run from the time a party consults with an attorney 
to determine whether the party has a legal basis for any claims. Pyramid Controls, Inc. v. 
Siemens Indus. Automation, Inc., 172 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 1999). The attorney in 
Pyramid—like Mr. Barton—determined that there was no claim to file and only later did 
the plaintiff come to believe otherwise. Id. The Pyramid court held that the statute of 
limitations was triggered "when the plaintiff presents facts reasonably indicating a claim 
to his or her attorney." Id. at 520. In this case, Ms. Montoya presented such facts to Mr. 
Barton in 1999. For this additional reason, the discovery rule cannot save Ms. Montoya's 
claim. 
Because Ms. Montoya did not file her complaint against Ford until more than two 
years after the accident and more than two years after retaining Mr. Barton, her claims 
are barred by the statute of limitations. 
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REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Ford also requests that it be awarded attorney fees for its work in responding to 
certain issues in the opening brief that are "not grounded in fact" or "not warranted by 
existing law." Utah R. App. P. 33. Specifically, Ford requests an award of fees for time 
spent responding to issues 1, 8, 9, 10, and 11. 
The first issue—alleged evidence tampering—has no basis in fact or law, as it was 
waived on at least three separate occasions. The eighth issue—alleged "coercion" of a 
verdict—was not preserved and fails under Utah Supreme Court precedent directly on 
point. The ninth issue—impartiality of a juror—alleges an error that the Claytons 
invited. The tenth issue—the statistical chart—alleges that the trial court should not 
have admitted evidence that was introduced through the Claytons' expert witness without 
objection.40 And the eleventh issue—Trooper Pace's testimony—alleges that the trial 
court should have excluded conclusions of Trooper Pace, even though the Claytons5 
counsel solicited from Fred Clayton the very conclusions Trooper Pace drew.41 
Pursuant to Rule 33(c)(1), Ford respectfully requests that it be awarded its attorney 
fees for time spent responding to these five issues. 
38
 The precedent is State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, 25 P.3d 985, and the Claytons appear to 
have been aware of it when they carefully worded their assertion that "[t]his is an issue of 
first impression in a civil case in Utah." (AOB at 49 (emphasis added).) The Claytons 
cannot believe that the civil/criminal distinction makes any difference, as they cite four 
criminal cases from other jurisdictions in support of their argument. (AOB at 49-50.) 
Specifically, the Claytons allege that the trial court erred in giving an instruction to the 
jury, an instruction to which counsel for the Claytons stipulated. (R. 11466 at 9-10.) 
40
 Addendum 18 of the Opening Brief, at Ford Exhibit 457, shows that it was introduced 
through Mr. Ingebresten without objection. 
41
 Fred Clayton's testimony about what Officer Pace told him is at R. 11459 at 26-27, and 
the Claytons' introduction of Officer Pace's accident report is at R. 11479 at 16. 
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CONCLUSION 
The opening brief provides no grounds for vacating the jury's verdict. Most of the 
issues raised in the opening brief were not preserved. Many others do not address the 
jury's sole finding of no defect, and therefore, cannot form a basis to vacate the jury's 
verdict. The only issue properly before the court concerns the exclusion of an expert 
report drafted by a non-testifying expert, which was properly excluded because the expert 
was not at trial to testify about the report. The court should affirm. 
In the event the Court reverses the jury's verdict on a ground relevant to 
Ms. Montoya's claims—issues 3,4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, or 11—the court should nonetheless 
affirm as to Ms. Montoya on the alternative ground that her claims are barred by the 
statute of limitations. 
Finally, the court should award Ford its attorney fees for time spent responding to 
issues 1, 8, 9, 10, and 11, which have no basis in fact or law. 
RESPECFULLY SUMITTED this 6th day of June, 2008. 
SNELL & WlLMER LLP 
Troy L. Booher 
Attorney for Ford Motor Company 
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Law Offices of Thor O. Emblem 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEE CLAYTON, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UTAH AUTO COLLECTION, et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1
 Case No. 000909522 
Hon. JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. 
April 27, 2005 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Defendant Ford Motor Company7 s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Against Plaintiff Kellie Montoya and Defendant's Motion 
to Strike. The Court heard oral argument with respect to the 
motions on April 11, 2005. Following the hearing, the matters 
were taken under advisement. 
The Court having considered the motions, memoranda, 
arguments of counsel, and for the good cause shown, hereby enters 
the following ruling. 
Specifically, this matter arose the result of an auto 
accident occurring in November of 1998. Specifically, Anthony 
Clayton was driving an Explorer and Kellie Montoya ("Montoya"), 
his fiance, was the front passenger. The vehicle suddenly went 
out of control and rolled multiple times. Clayton was killed and 
Montoya suffered severe head, neck and back injuries. 
CLAYTON v. UTAH AUTO Page 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The Claytons filed the original complaint in this matter. 
Montoya filed her complaint against Defendants on May 14, 2002. 
In response to Montoya's Complaint, Defendants filed a Motion to 
Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment on 
the basis that Montoya's claims were barred by the applicable 
two-year statue of limitations for product liability claims. 
Montoya replied by submitting a Rule 56(f) motion with a 
supporting affidavit, asserting that discovery was necessary to 
determine what she knew or should have known regarding her claims 
within the two-year statute of limitations period. On November 
22, 2002, Judge Noel denied the Motion to Dismiss without 
prejudice, indicating the motion could be re-filed after further 
discovery, if Ford felt dismissal remained warranted. In the 
course of discovery in this matter, both Montoya and Keith Barton 
("Barton") , the attorney she consulted to obtain a settlement 
from Geico (the Claytons' insurer), were deposed regarding the 
material facts surrounding the statute of limitations issues. As 
a result of those depositions, Defendants renew their Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
In support of their renewed motion, Defendant asserts 
Montoya had knowledge or sufficient facts at the time of the 
accident, to put her on notice to inquire about specific alleged 
defects in the Clayton Explorer. Specifically, argues Defendant, 
Montoya hired an attorney to conduct an investigation and the 
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undisputed facts show that the Claytons, with knowledge of and 
access to the exact same facts, filed their complaint within two 
years of the accident. Where the Claytons and their counsel 
could reasonably investigate, discover, and file a product defect 
claim arising out of the same accident, it is Defendant's 
position Montoya cannot now claim that it was not possible for 
her and her attorney, to not timely file. In sum, because 
Montoya waited 3 H years after the accident to file her 
Complaint, it is Defendant's position her claims are barred by 
the two-year statute of limitations. 
Plaintiff opposes the motion arguing Defendant has presented 
no new evidence to support its argument that Montoya or her 
attorney had knowledge or reason to believe the Explorer's 
defects were the actual cause of the rollover accident and 
Montoya's injuries. Indeed, asserts Plaintiff, the only new 
evidence is the fact that Barton personally interviewed the 
Highway Patrol Officer, who investigated the accident and 
determined that the cause was driver error. Further, contends 
Plaintiff, there is nothing in the old evidence to indicate 
Barton was not reasonably diligent in investigating the cause of 
the accident or that Montoya knew or should have known of the 
cause of the accident. Indeed, asserts Montoya, she suffered a 
brain injury as a result of the accident and to this day suffers 
residual effects. 
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Finally, argues Plaintiff, as part of her original Rule 
56(f) Motion, she sought information related to Ford's knowledge 
and/or coverup of the defects and to date, discovery related to 
this issue remains incomplete.1 
The statute of limitations begins to run when a "claimant in 
such action discovered, or in the exercise of due diligence 
should have discovered, both the harm and its cause." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-15-3. In other words, the discovery rule under the 
product liability statute of limitations is an objective 
reasonable person standard. This said, under Utah law, "[t]he 
discovery rule does not allow plaintiffs to delay filing suit 
until they have ascertained every last detail of their claims." 
McCollin v. Svnthes Inc., 50 F.Supp. 2d 1119, 1124 (D. Utah 
1999). Rather, the information is sufficient if it would "put a 
reasonable person on inquiry." Safsten v. LPS Social Services, 
Inc., 942 P.2d 949, 953 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Applying the aforementioned to .the facts of this case, it is 
undisputed Plaintiff knew of the harm she suffered, the question 
defendant has moved to strike the Declaration of Thor 
Emblem submitted in support of Plaintiff's Opposition. After 
reviewing the record with respect to the matter, the Court agrees 
with Defendant that the inclusion of such information would, in 
effect, make Mr. Emblem a fact witness. Moreover, should 
Plaintiff continue to find this information necessary to her 
case, its inclusion is possible by other, more appropriate, 
means. Based upon the forgoing, Defendant's Motion to Strike is 
granted. 
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is whether and at what time she knew, or at least should have 
known, the cause. While this is a close call, made even further 
complicated by the fact that Plaintiff hired an attorney to 
conduct an investigation with respect to the accident, viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
the Court is not persuaded the undisputed facts are sufficient to 
permit a ruling as a matter of law that Plaintiff had sufficient 
information to put a reasonable person on inquiry. Accordingly, 
Defendant Ford Motor Company's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Against Plaintiff Kellie Montoya is, respectfully, 
denied. ^-
lis DATED thi ./, /day of April, 2005 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright 2008 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group. 
All rights reserved. 
* * * STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2007 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION * * * 
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TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART-II. ACTIONS, VENUE, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 
CHAPTER 15. PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT 
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3 (2008) 
Legislative Alert: 
LEXSEE 2008 Ut. HB 78 - See section 979. 
§ 78-15-3. Statute of limitations 
A civil action under this chapter shall be brought within two years from the t ime the 
individual who would be the claimant in such action discovered, or in the exercise of due 
diligence should have discovered, both the harm and its cause. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 78-15-3, enacted by L. 1989, ch. 119, 5 1. 
NOTES: 
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section, effective April 24, 1989. 
CROSS-REFERENCES. -Ef fect of disability on limitations generally, 5 78-12-36. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT L I ^ C 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEE CLAYTON, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY 
Defendants. 
SPECIAI^TERDICT 
Case No. 000909522 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Unless otherwise indicated, please answer the following questions from a preponderance 
of the evidence. If you find the evidence preponderates in favor of the issue presented, answer 
"Yes." If you find the evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot determine a 
preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that the evidence preponderates against the issue 
presented, answer "No." At least six jurors must agree on the answer to each question, but they 
need not be the same six on each question. 
1. When the subject 1997 Ford Explorer left Ford Motor Company was it in a defective 
condition, unreasonably dangerous to the plaintiffs? 
Yes No £-
If you answered "No" to Question No. 1, skip to Question No. 11. If you answered 
"Yes" to Question No. 1, move on to Question No. 2. 
2. Was this defect the proximate cause of the accident and Tony Clayton's injuries? 
Yes No 
3. Was this defect the proximate cause of the accident and Kellie Montoya's injuries? 
Yes No 
1 \r\\nrt& 
4. Was the subject 1997 Ford Explorer reasonably suitable for the purpose for which it is 
ordinarily used? 
Yes No 
If you answered "No" to Question No. 4, skip to Question No. 7. If you answered 
"Yes" to Question No. 4, move on to Question No. 5. 
5. If you found that that the subject 1997 Explorer was not reasonably suitable for the 
purpose for which it is ordinarily used, was this condition the proximate cause of the 
accident and Tony Clayton's injuries? 
Yes No 
6. If you found that that the subject 1997 Explorer was not reasonably suitable for the 
purpose for which it is ordinarily used, was this condition the proximate cause of the 
accident and Kellie Montoya's injuries? 
Yes No 
7. Did Defendant Ford Motor Company negligently inflict emotional distress upon Plaintiff 
Kellie Montoya? 
Yes No 
8. Considering all of the evidence, was Tony Clayton negligent? 
Yes No 
If you answered "No" to Question No. 8, skip to Question No. 11. If you answered 
"Yes" to Question No. 8, move on to Question No. 9. 
9. If your answer to Question 8 is "Yes", answer the following question: Was Tony 
Clayton's negligence a proximate cause of the accident and the injuries suffered by the 
Plaintiffs? 
Yes No 
If you answered "No" to Question No. 9, skip to Question No. 11. If you answered 
"Yes" to Question No. 9, move on to Question No. 10. 
10. Assuming the combined fault of the parties in causing the accident and injuries to total 
100%, what percentage of fault do you attribute to: 
Tony Clayton % 
Ford Motor Company % 
Total: 100 % 
2 
\h\nrPi 
11. Please identify the date upon which Kellie Montoya knew, or through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered, both her harm and its cause: 
Date: ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ g ^ ^ O O ^ 
If you answered "No" to Question No. 1, stop here, and sign and date this verdict. 
Do not answer Question No. 12. If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 1, proceed 
to Question 12. 
12. Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Ford acted with a knowing and 
reckless indifference toward and a disregard of the safety and rights of the Plaintiffs? 
Yes No 
Dated this *7 day of j r^bmflAy- , 2007. 
Foreperson 
\tMJ0 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL BiRS«Rat0!PY^\N 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE •yQg--JfflMfr---^ i^ c^ Jf-
DEE CLAYTON, et al. , 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UTAH AUTO COLLECTION, et al. , ! 
Defendants. 
, ., , . , -.., .. „ 1 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 000909522 
Hon. JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. 
May 30, 2007 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and 
Motion for New Trial, and Plaintiffs' Motion to Tax Costs. The 
Court heard oral argument with respect to the motions on May 7 
and May 15, 2007. Following the hearings, the matters were taken 
under advisement. 
The Court having considered the motions, memoranda, exhibits 
attached thereto and for the good cause shown, hereby enters the 
following ruling. 
Specifically, this Complaint centers around an automobile 
accident occurring on November 27, 1998, wherein Anthony Clayton 
was killed after the 1997 Ford Explorer he was driving rolled 
over. Kellie Montoya was the front seat passenger in the vehicle 
at the time of the accident. 
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Turning initially to their Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial, Plaintiffs 
argue the Court should enter judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, 
notwithstanding the jury's verdict, because Parker Engineering 
tampered with the evidence by adjusting the fork bolts on the 
Clayton door latch to match its newly produced version of the 
facts proffered by Ed Caulfield (Ford's expert) on how the latch 
opened. Specifically, assert Plaintiffs, Caulfield testified 
that if the door latch was open, it would be due to 
foreshortening, not Ford's theory of overloading the door. In 
this case, contend Plaintiffs, there was overwhelming evidence 
presented at trial that the door latch was open. 
Alternatively, Plaintiffs move the Court for a new trial 
based on prejudicial error. Specifically, argue Plaintiffs, the 
Court refused to allow the Plaintiffs to present evidence that 
another Ford door latch engineer, Tom Tiede, had previously found 
that the door latch was fully open, which would have affected the 
jury's decision on whether the door latch was defective. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs contend that it was prejudicial error to 
permit Officer Pace to testify and that his testimony bolstered 
the testimony of Ford's experts. Finally, Plaintiffs argue a new 
trial should be granted because the errors that occurred at trial 
were compounded because the Court ordered the jury sequestered on 
M V T ^ 
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Friday afternoon until it reached a verdict. 
Defendants oppose the motion arguing the subject door latch 
was inspected and photographed by Plaintiffs1 expert, Andrew 
Gilberg, long before Caulfield and Packer Engineering were 
involved in this case. Indeed, assert Defendants, in his 
inspection report, Gilberg notes that he could not move the lower 
fork bolt into the secondary position. In addition, contend 
Defendants, Gilberg testified that the fork bolts were pinned and 
would not move to the fully open position. 
At the time of trial, argue Defendants, Gilberg had custody 
of the subject latch which was marked and admitted as Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 334. At no time, assert Defendants, did Gilberg suggest 
that the subject door latch had been modified, tampered with or 
damaged, other than during the rollover accident. Nor, contend 
Defendants, had Gilberg, ever accused Caulfield, Kevin Vosburgh 
or Packer Engineering of tampering or fraud in any way. Indeed, 
argue Defendants, Gilberg testified that the latch frame and 
internal components were severely damaged during the rollover and 
that the fork bolts would not fully open. 
As an initial matter, a Rule 50 motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict is governed by the same rules 
applicable to a Rule 59 motion for directed verdict. This said, 
as a procedural matter, Plaintiffs' motion for JNOV is denied as 
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they failed to timely move for directed verdict on the door latch 
claim. Indeed, even if this did not decide the matter, after 
reviewing the record, the Court is of the opinion there is ample 
evidence to support the jury's finding regarding the door latch. 
Consequently, Plaintiffs1 JNOV motion is also denied on the 
merits. 
With respect to the motion for new trial, the Court notes 
the decision to exclude the Tiede Report occurred after 
considerable opportunity for both sides to present their 
arguments. Further, the Court remains convinced that the 
decision to exclude was based upon sound reasoning. With respect 
to Trooper Pace, the record indicates he provided sufficient 
foundational testimony to support his statements regarding the 
conclusions of his accident investigation and there is no basis 
to find the decision not to strike his testimony was improper 
under either Rule 702 or Rule 403. Finally, under the 
circumstances, the Court is not convinced there was any error on 
its part in ordering the jury sequestered during deliberations. 
Turning next to the Motion to Tax Costs, as an initial 
matter, although the Court's Pre-Trial Order required the parties 
to "exchange" their "documents and exhibits," such are not 
taxable as costs. Indeed, "ft]rial exhibits are expenses of 
litigation and not taxable as costs. Beaver County v. Quest, 
MTn^L 
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Inc., 2001 UT 81 P25 (Utah 2001) see also, Young v. State, 2000 
UT 91, P23 (Utah 2000) 
With respect to vehicle storage, the Court is not persuaded 
the cost of storing/towing the vehicle is authorized under the 
statute. Accordingly, such are denied. 
As for mediation costs, these are recoverable under Utah law 
and are awarded. See Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 977 
P.2d 508, 516 (Utah Court App. 1999) . 
With regard to costs for a copy of Ford's expert witness and 
employee designee deposition transcripts, after reviewing the 
record and the relevant law, the Court is not persuaded such were 
essential to Defendantsfs case or that there were no other 
methods of acquiring the information contained in the 
depositions. Consequently, these costs are denied. 
On the issue of reporter fees and transcripts, the parties 
agreed in advance to share such costs and that is what the Court 
is ordering. 
Deposition costs for Cantu, Pace and Barton are permitted as 
all three were used in the development and defense of this case. 
Further, Ford is entitled to recover fees paid to witnesses, but 
is admonished to review its entries and check for duplication. 
Finally, any judgment for recoverable costs is awarded 
against all losing parties as Plaintiffs' claim, although based 
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on different causes of action, rested on the underlying theory 
that the Ford Explorer was defective and unreasonably dangerous. 
Based upon the forgoing, Plaintiffs' Motion to Tax Costs is 
granted in part and denied in part. Defendants are asked to 
prepare an amended and verified bill of costs in accordance with 
this ruling. 
DATED this /fo day of May, 2007. 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOLORES CLAYTON, et al. 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UTAH AUTO COLLECTION, et al. 
Defendants. 
Case No. 000909522 
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL 
REQUEST OF ORAL ARGUMENT 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto 
Pursuant to Rule 59 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs Amend the Motion for New 
Trial filed in this Court to consider and include the grounds (a)(1): A new trial should be granted 
because of an irregularity in the proceedings - Ford Motor Company presented false evidence 
pertaining to the door latch defect and perpetrated a fraud on the jury; and because the jury was 
Third Judicial District 
APR 1 6 2007 
'Y- eputy Clerk 
coerced into a verdict. The grounds supporting the grant of a new trial are set forth in the 
original moving papers previously filed and in the Reply Memorandum filed herein. 
DATED this 13™ day of April, 2007. 
THOR O. EMBLEM 
MATTHEW H. RATY 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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Attorneys for Defendants 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEE CLAYTON, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UTAH AUTO COLLECTION, et al., 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 
37 - TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE 
REGARDING BRONCO II AND UN46 
MODEL EXPLORERS 
Case No. 000909522 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto 
Pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants Ford Motor 
Company, BCW Enterprises, Inc. dba Warner Super Ford Store, and FRN of Greater Salt Lake 
City, L.L.C. dba Utah Auto Collection (collectively referred to as "Ford") respectfully submit 
this memorandum in support of their Motion to Exclude Evidence regarding Bronco II and UN46 
Model Explorers. 
EVIDENCE TO BE EXCLUDED 
This case arises out of a single-vehicle rollover accident that occurred on November 27, 
1998. The vehicle at issue is a 1997 Ford Explorer (also known as a UN 105 Explorer), which 
was driven by Tony Clayton, the late son of Plaintiffs Fred and Dee Clayton. For unknown 
reasons, Tony Clayton lost control of the vehicle at freeway speeds. He then made several sharp 
steering inputs, which caused the vehicle to exit the roadway, and to roll four times over a 
distance of 108 feet. Plaintiffs contend that a variety of design defects in the subject 1997 Ford 
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Explorer contributed to the vehicle rolling over and that other alleged defects affected the crash-
worthiness of the vehicle. Ford vigorously denies these allegations. 
Ford anticipates that plaintiffs' counsel may attempt to make references to or seek to 
introduce evidence relating to the Ford Bronco II and / or an earlier model of the Ford Explorer 
known as the UN46. As explained below, evidence relating to the Bronco II and the UN46 is 
irrelevant to any issue of consequence in this case. In addition, even if there were some marginal 
relevance in evidence relating to the Bronco II or the UN46, its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the likelihood of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, and misleading the jury. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Ford introduced the Explorer to the market in model year 1991 The first generation of 
Explorers were designated under a program known as UN46, which encompasses all 1991-1994 
model year Explorers. In 1995, Ford made substantial changes to the design of the Explorer, 
which resulted in a new major program designated as the UN 105. The UN 105 model Explorers 
include the 1995-1997 model years, such as the subject accident vehicle driven by Tony Clayton. 
Ford later "freshened" the Explorer designed in 1998, and refers to all models sold in the 1998-
2001 model years as the UN 150 program. 
Ford anticipates that Plaintiffs will attempt to introduce evidence regarding the UN46 
Explorer, as well as Bronco II, a smaller, lighter vehicle that was taken off the market 
approximately 7 years before the Clayton vehicle was manufactured. These vehicles were sold 
by Ford as follows• 
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Differences Between the UN105 and UN46 
The UN 105 Explorer that is the subject of this lawsuit is a complete and total redesign of 
the UN46 Explorer. Among other things, the UN 105 has an entirely different type of front 
suspension known as the Short Long Arm ("SLA") front suspension, while the UN46 had a Twin 
I-Beam front suspension. See Affidavit of Don Tandy (submitted in MDL litigation and attached 
hereto as Exhibit A. The UN 105 also has a different rear suspension, different frame, different 
stabilizer bar, and different springs than the UN46. The UN46 was also designed and tested in 
the late 1980s, while the UN 105 was designed and tested in the early 1990s. Id. 
The following table summarizes certain pertinent differences between the UN 105 and the 
UN46 Explorer: 
k: - / / ; SYSTEMS ; 
Front Suspension 
II Rear Suspension 
|| Vehicle Frame 
! UN46 EXPLORER 
j.
 N;,v% (1991-1994) .. .-
Twin I-Beam, front axles, radius 
arms, and spindle. 
23 mm front stabilizer bar. 
Coil springs. 
Recirculating ball steering gear. | 
Higher rate 2-stage leaf springs. 1 
16 mm rear stabilizer bar. I 
No lateral shock absorber. 
Mostly a Osection frame. J 
[ UN105/ EXPLORERS 1 
[ (1995 - 1997) 
Short Long Arm, lower control 
arm, upper control arm, and 
spindle. 
1 36.3 mm front stabilizer bar. 1 
Torsion bar springs. || 
Rack and pinion steering gear. 
Lower rate 2-stage leaf springs. 
21 mm rear stabilizer bar 1 
Lateral shock absorber 
I Boxed frame from front bumper II 
to middle of vehicle. II 
Differences Between the Bronco II and UN105 
Likewise, the UN 105 Explorer and the Bronco II are completely different vehicles with 
substantially different designs. The UN 105 Explorer was designed and manufactured almost a 
full decade after the Bronco II ceased production. The UN 105 Explorer is a wider, longer, and 
heavier vehicle than the Bronco II. It is also a two-door vehicle, while the Clayton's Explorer 
has 4 doors. The rear suspensions are different, the steering systems are different, the frames are 
different, and the wheels and tires are different on the UN 105 Explorer and the Bronco II. Due 
in part to these differences, the UN 105 Explorer and the Bronco II have very different handling 
and stability characteristics. Id. 
The following table summarizes some of the critical differences between the UN 105 
Explorer and the Bronco II-
Ik^^M^k- test 
11 Size/Dimensions 
|| Front Suspension 
|| Rear Suspension 
|| Tires 
The Bronco II is shorter, 
narrower, and lighter. 
Twin I-Beam, which does not 1 
share one major component 
with the UN46 Twin I-Beam. 
1 Coil springs. 1 
1 Different front axle, spindle, 1 
1 shock absorbers, stabilizer 
bar, and brake assembly. 
Overslung leaf springs. | 
Different rear axle, leaf 1 
springs, shock absorbers, 
stabilizer bar, brackets, and 
brake assembly. 
Offered only smaller 1 
P195/75R15orP205/70R15 
tires. 
p r ?UN105 EXPLORERS || 
The Explorer is longer, 
wider, and heavier than the 
Bronco II. 
J Short Long Arm. 
1 Torsion bar springs. 
Different front axle, spindle, 
J shock absorbers, stabilizer 1 
1 bar, and brake assembly 
Underslung 2-stage leaf 1 
springs. 1 
Different rear axle, leaf 
springs, shock absorbers. 
stabilizer bar, brackets, and 
brake assembly. 
Offered with P255/70R16, 
P235/75R15,and 
P225/70R15tires. 
ARGUMENT 
Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence distinctly provides that "evidence which is not 
relevant is not admissible " See Utah R. Evid. 402. Further, even if evidence is marginally 
relevant, it "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
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unfair prejudice, confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." See Utah R. Evid. 403. 
Here, the Ford Bronco II and UN46 are fundamentally different vehicles with 
substantially different designs and handling capabilities from the UN 105. These vehicles were 
designed years before the Clayton's UNI05 Explorer, and have no bearing on the jury's 
evaluation of the subject accident vehicle. In fact, the Ford ceased manufacture of the Bronco II 
in 1990, almost 7 years before the Clayton's vehicle was manufactured. Quite simply, the 
subject the design history, testing, and performance of the Bronco II and UN46 have no 
relevance to the jury's consideration of Plaintiffs' claims regarding the UN 105 Explorer. See 
Jordan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 624 F. Supp. 72, 78 (E.D. La. 1985) (excluding as irrelevant 
evidence of dissimilar defects in other make, year and model GM vehicles). 
Furthermore, allowing Plaintiffs to present evidence regarding the design, history or 
performance of the Bronco II and UN46 would be unduly prejudicial to Ford. See Utah R. Evid. 
403. Any evidence about Bronco II or UN46 will confuse the jury and improperly divert its 
attention from the 1997 Explorer at issue in this case. Introduction of evidence regarding 
unrelated vehicles will also create a substantial risk that the jury will improperly apply 
information about the Bronco II and / or UN46 to the subject 1997 Explorer, which will result in 
irreparable prejudice against Ford. 
Moreover, if evidence regarding the Bronco II and UN46 are admitted, Ford will be 
forced to defend all three vehicles, which will necessarily result in confusion and delay. In 
particular, if Plaintiffs are allowed to introduce this evidence, Ford will be required to defend the 
design decisions made for each of the three vehicles, explain the differences in the vehicles, and 
demonstrate to jury why the evidence presented by the Plaintiffs have presented is irrelevant to 
the design questions concerning the UN 105 Explorer. This may add several weeks to the trial 
and essentially triple the amount of evidence introduced on design defect claims. For this reason 
alone, evidence regarding the Bronco II and UN46 should be excluded. See e.g., Palmer v. City 
of Monticello, 31 F.3d 1499, 1507 n.l l (10th Cir. 1994) (noting that court did not abuse 
discretion in excluding evidence that "would have diverted the trial from its main focus"); 
Gilbert v. Cosco, Inc., 989 F.2d 399, 404-05 (10th Cir. 1993) (upholding trial court's decision to 
preclude evidence of different models with different designs as unfairly prejudicial). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Ford requests that this Court preclude plaintiffs, their 
attorneys, or their experts from referring to or attempting to offer evidence relating to the Bronco 
II or the UN46 Explorer not at issue in this lawsuit 
lis (^ 3av DATED th  6 ^ y of November, 2006. 
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. 
£ j&? ^'CJ^~-
Dan R. Larsen 
Kimberly Neville 
Karthik Nadesan 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT : COUNTY OF QUEENS 
HYE-YEON CHO a/k/a JOY CHO 
Plaintiffs 
vs. 
BRBDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC., 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, 
LEAH CHUN and BYUNG CHUN 
Defendants 
HYE-LIM CHUN a/k/a LEAH CHUN 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC., 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Action No. 2 
and BYUNG CHUN 
Index No. 20183/02 
Defendants 
STATE OF TEXAS ) 
) s s : 
COUNTY OF MONTGOMERY ) 
DONALD F. TANDY, JR., being duly sworn, deposes and based on his personal 
knowledge, states as follows: 
L I am a United States citizen and a resident of die State of Texas 
2, I am an employee of Tandy Engineering & Associates, Inc, a Texas 
corporation at 25503 Pitkin Road, Suite F100, The Woodlands, T X 
3. I received a Bachelor of Science in 1985 and a Master of Science in 1986 
in mechanical engineering at The Ohio State University in Columbus, Ohio. My 
cuaiculum included courses involving vehicle dynamics and computer modeling. In 
addition to my formal education, I have over seventeen years engineering experience in 
motor vehicle related areas including design, vehicle dynamics, accident reconstruction, 
Action No. 1 
Index No. 29583/01 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
OF FORD'S MOTION 
IN LIMINE No. 2 
and computer simulation. In my previous position as an employee at Ford Motor 
Company, I was responsible for supervising the standardization and development of the 
vehicle dynamics handling and steering tests as well as computei modeling tools and 
processes for Ford worldwide, which includes operations in North America, Germany 
and England. I also worked on the design and development of the suspension systems of 
the Ford Explorer and Ford Ranger vehicles. 
4. I was retained by attorneys representing Ford Motor Company in matters 
captioned HYE-YEON CHO a/k/a JOY CHO v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, et al. and 
HYE-LIM CHUN a/k/a LEAH CHUN v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, et al.. to evaluate 
the handling and stability characteristics of the 1998 Ford Explorer utility vehicle. I have 
also been retained by Ford Motor Company on other occasions to evaluate the handling 
and stability characteristics of Ford Bronco 33 utility vehicles and the previous generation 
1991 to 1994 Ford Explorer vehicles. 
5. It is my understanding that plaintiffs contend that the 1998 Foid Exploier 
is substantially similar to the Bronco II. The similarities between these vehicles end after 
the blue Ford oval on the grille. In fact, the Bronco II is very different in size, shape, and 
design from the 1998 Ford Explorer. 
6. The 1998 Ford Explorer and the Bronco II are substantially different 
vehicles. These differences include the following: 
a. Dirnensionally, the Explorer is a wider, longer and heavier vehicle than 
the Bronco II, The Explorer involved in this case had four doors (i.e., the 
Bronco II had only two) and had much larger gross vehicle weight ratings 
("GVWs") and gross axle weight ratings ('GAWRs"). 
b. The Bronco II and 1998 Explorer have different front suspension types. 
The Bronco II uses a Twin I-Beam or Twin Traction Beam front 
suspension whereas the 1998 Explorer employs a short-long arm ("SLA") 
front suspension. Also, the Bronco II has coil springs in the front 
suspension while the 1998 Explorer employs torsion bar springs. There is 
nol one component in the front suspension of the 1998 Explorer that is ^ 
sheared with the Bronco H These differences include front axles, control 
arrns, spindles, bushings, suspension mounting brackets, radius arms, 
springs, shock absorbers, stabilizer bar, and brake assemblies. 
c. Compared to the Bronco II, the 1998 Explorer has a unique and different 
rear suspension. In fact, the Explorer and the Bronco II have two totally 
different designs. The Explorer employs an underslung leaf spring rear 
suspension while the Bronco H employs overslung springs. This major 
difference forces the two suspensions to behave differently. There is not 
one major component in the rear suspension of the Explorer that is taken 
from or shared with the Bronco II. These differences include the rear axle, 
leaf springs, shock absorbers, stabilizer bar, brackets, and brake 
assemblies. 
d. The steering system of a 1998 Explorer is different from that of a Bronco 
II- The 1998 Explorer has a rack and pinion steering gear with equal 
length tie rods for the left and right wheels. The Bronco II uses a 
recirculating ball steering gear with a pitman arm, a drag link, and a single 
tie rod. There is not one major component in the steering system of the 
1998 Explorer that is shared with the Bronco EL These differences include 
the tie rod ends, the tie rods, the drag link, the pitman ami, and the 
steering gear. 
e. The frames of the Bronco II and 1998 Explorer are very different in 
length, width, type of boxing, and in the cross member design. The frame 
is the component that the suspension members are attached and the means 
by which forces are transferred from the suspension to the body. 
f. The wheels and tires differed between the 1998 Explorer and the Bronco 
IX The 1998 Explorers were offered with P225/70R15, P235/75R15, or 
P255/70R16 tires while the Bronco II came with either P195/75R15 or 
P205/70R15 tires. 
Due in part to the differences described above, the 1998 Explorer and Bronco II have 
different steering, handling and stability characteristics. 
7. It is my understanding that plaintiffs also contended that the 1998 
Explorers are substantially similar to the 1991 and 1994 Explorer vehicles. Between 
1990 and 1994, Ford engineers including myself redesigned the Explorer and produced 
the 1995 through 1997 series of Explorer vehicles The post 1995 Explorers do not steer 
or handle the same as tht previous version of the Explorer, This is due to specific design 
differences between the two versions of the Explorer which include the following: 
a. Compared to the 1991 to 1994 Explorer, the 1998 Explorer has unique and 
different front suspension. In fact, there is not one major component in 
the front suspension of the 1998 Explorer that is shared with any previous 
version of Explorer. These differences include front axles, spindles, 
radius arms, coil springs, shock absorbers, control arms, bushings, 
suspension brackets, stabilizer bar, and brake assemblies. 
b. The 1998 Explorer and 1991 to 1994 Explorers share a similar design type 
and layout for the rear suspension, however, many components which 
affect the steering, handling, and stability characteristics of the vehicle 
were changed for the 1998 Explorer. These differences include the leaf 
springs, shock absorbers, stabilizer bar, brackets, and brake assemblies. 
c. The frames of the 1991 to 1994 Explorer are different than those of the 
1998 Explorer There are differences in layout, type of boxing, and in the 
cross member design. The frame is the component that the suspension 
members are attached and the means by which forces are transferred from 
the suspension to the body, 
d. The steering system of a 1998 Explorer is different from that of the 1991 
to 1994 Ford Explorer. The 1998 Explorer has a rack and pinion steering 
gear with equal length tie rods for the left and right wheels. The previous 
generation Explorer used a recirculating ball steering gear with a pitman 
arm, a drag link, and a single tie rod. There is not one major component in 
the steering system of the 1998 Explorer that is shared with the 1991 to 
1994 Explorers- These differences include the tie rod ends, the tie rods, 
the drag link, the pitman arm, and the steering gear. 
Due in part to the differences above, the 1998 Explorers and 1991 and 1994 Explorers 
will have different steering, handling and stability characteristics. 
Sworn to before me this 
lit: day of February, 2005. 
?VL 
Notary Public 
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